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MARCH 1993	 NUMBER 2
CREDULOUS COURTS AND THE TORTURED
TRILOGY: THE IMPROPER USE OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TITLE VII AND
ADEA CASES'
ANN C. MCGINLEY *
INTRODUCTION
Civil rights are under siege. In mid-1989, the United States
Supreme Court decided several cases' that severely limit the civil
rights claims and remedies available to a plaintiff claiming employ-
ment discrimination. 2 Experts have widely criticized those decisions,
t Copyright C 1993 Ann C. McGinley.
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D. 1982, University of Pennsylvania. The
author thanks Dean David Trager and the Brooklyn Law School faculty for their support as
well as Professor Jeremy Stempel for thoughtful comments on previous drafts and research
assistants Jessica Hausnecht and Barbara DiDomenico for valuable contributions to this
Article. This project was supported by a Brooklyn Law School stipend.
See Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 161 (1989) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act § 4(1)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) ("ADEA"), exempts
bona fide employee benefit plans from its scope unless a plaintiff can prove that the plan is
a subterfuge for discrimination); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989)
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) to cover racially motivated conduct only at the initial
stages of contract formation and not applicable to on-the-job racial discrimination); Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (statute of limitations commences under
Title VII when employer adopts a facially neutral seniority system, not when the system
affects plaintiff claiming disparate impact); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759, 761-62 (1989)
(consent decrees are not binding on third parties); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989) (plaintiff proving disparate impact under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1988), has the burden of showing not only a statistical disparity but also
that the disparity is the result of' one or more specific practices of the employer).
2 These decisions were announced during the United States Supreme Court's 1988 Term.
Because the decisions were actually handed down in the summer of 1989, however, this
Article will refer to them as "the 1989 decisions."
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with one expert terming them a "tragedy" 3 for minorities and
women. 4
 In response to the Court's limitations on civil rights claims
and remedies, which set back civil rights law eighteen years, 5 civil
rights activists lobbied Congress to pass legislation that would re-
store the civil rights formerly enjoyed by members of protected
classes. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 by a wide
margin, only to be thwarted by President Bush's veto. 6 Finally, two
3 See Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII, 56 BROOK, L. REV. 1107, 1107 (1991).
' See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 DEN", U. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse
and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 615 (1990). In her article, Linda
Holdeman notes that the civil rights decisions of 1989 signal a policy shift away from the
goals Congress articulated at the time it enacted Title VII and furthered by the Court in its
early decisions interpreting the Act. Holdeman, supra, at 46-47 & nn. 235-38. The Court's
earlier decisions, including its creation of models of proof described in Part I of the text of
this Article, furthered the congressional purpose of eradicating employment discrimination.
The 1989 cases, however, elevate the interests of advantaged groups over those of disadvan-
taged groups. One possible explanation is that Congress passed Title VII when the country's
economy was booming, and this was no longer the case in 1989. The Court's shift away from
an aggressive policy to achieve racial and sexual equality may be the result of economic
retrenchment.
Another justification for such a shift would be that the civil rights goals have been
achieved, but this does not appear to be the case. Black unemployment was significantly
higher than that of Whites in the first quarter of 1989. Id. at 53. The inability of minorities
and women to rise in the ranks in their companies remains a significant problem. See Today's
Summary and Analysis, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-3 (Aug. 23, 1991) ("vast majority of suits
now challenge discharge rather than hiring decisions"). Congress formally recognized this
problem when it introduced the Glass Ceiling Act as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, §$ 201-210, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081-87 (1991), to help women and
minorities advance in the workplace.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which established the disparate impact
model, freeing a plaintiff from proving that a defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff where the defendant's employment practices had a disparate impact on members
of the protected class, was decided 18 years before. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642, is generally
considered to have overruled Griggs. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
26 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 564.
6
 President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on October 22, 1990, arguing that
the legislation would force employers to adopt quotas to avoid liability from lawsuits. The
Senate voted 66 to 34 to overturn the veto but fell one vote short of the necessary two-thirds
majority for an override. See Sam Fulwood III, Bush's Veto of Rights Bill Survives in Senate by
One Vote, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al.
The Bush veto, combined with the Bush Court's theory of "strict" construction of status
had an anti-majoritarian result. For the Bush Court, strict construction seemed to be a
synonym for narrow construction, with Reagan and Bush appointees implicitly reasoning
that if the Court's interpretation of a statute were too restrictive, the Congress could always
amend the statute. See Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a President's Legacy,
N.Y. Timm, July 1, 1992, at A13 ("True to the key tenets of the conservative judicial agenda,
these judges tend to construe laws as narrowly as possible. . . They also typically defer to
Congress in deciding close constitutional issues."). This theory of statutory construction
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and a half years after the Supreme Court handed down its decisions,
and in response to heightened political pressures, President Bush
agreed to sign the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 7
This Act restores many of the rights that plaintiffs suing under
the civil rights laws had before the 1989 Supreme Court decisions. 8
It also grants some new rights to plaintiffs suing under the civil
rights laws.' By all appearances, those favoring a strong national
policy protecting the civil rights of minorities, women, the disabled
and the aged have won the political battle. There remains, however,
a significant stumbling block to the enjoyment of civil rights in the
workplace. Few lawyers are unaware of the Supreme Court's de-
vastating civil rights decisions in 1989 and the congressional battle
to correct them. Another phenomenon, less obvious but equally
destructive, silently curtails workers' civil rights claims: the increased
ignores the reality of the frequency and success of the President Bush veto. As of October
1, 1992, the President had vetoed 35 bills. Congress had failed to override a single veto. See
Adam Clymer, House Votes to Sustain Presidents Veto of the Family Leave Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1992, at D24.
7 See Andrew Rosenthal, Reaffirming Commitment, Bush Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1991, at A 1. Even though he signed the bill, there was significant controversy over
whether President Bush was attempting to undermine the rights protected by the bill. Id.
The President issued a "signing statement" explaining that the statement made by Senator
Robert Dole interpreting the Civil Rights Act would "be treated as an authoritative interpre-
tive guidance by all officials in the executive branch" with respect to the law. Statement on
Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701, 1702 (Nov. 21,
1991). The Dole memorandum is generally considered to be the most conservative interpre-
tation of the Act. See 137 Corgc. REC. S15472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
8 The purpose of the Act is:
to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve federal civil
rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional employment discrim-
ination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact actions, and for other
purposes.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Act specifically finds that the decision in
Wards Cove "has weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections." Id.
§ 2(2). Among its purposes are to overrule the proof burdens and meaning of business
necessity in Wards Cove; to codify the proof burdens and the meaning of business necessity
used in Griggs; and "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination." Id. §$ 3(2), (4).
9 For example, the Act creates a right for plaintiffs suing for intentional discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to compensatory and punitive damages and, where
the plaintiff seeks such damages, the Act grants to both parties a right to demand a trial by
jury. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (amending § 1977 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)) [hereinafter "Civil Rights Act of 1991"]. The
Act also creates a right of action for employees of Congress under Title VII § 19. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991 § 301. Some opine, however, that although the Act may strengthen the
cause of action of those suing for intentional discrimination, it does not do the same for
plaintiffs suing under the disparate impact theory.
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inappropriate use of summary judgment. This misapplication of
civil procedural rules to employment discrimination cases threatens
substantive anti-discrimination law.
This Article examines the gradual and continuing erosion of
the factfinder's role in federal employment discrimination cases and
its replacement by an increasing use of summary judgment through
which the courts make pretrial determinations formerly reserved
for the factfinder at trial. This trend not only represents a major
shift in court procedure and, in the case of age discrimination
claims, a transfer of power from juries to judges, but also substan-
tially undermines the efficacy of the nation's laws against discrimi-
nation.l°
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three summary judgment
cases that have had perhaps an even more devastating effect on
civil rights law than the substantive decisions of the 1989 cases. This
"trilogy" of summary judgment cases—Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,' 2
 and Celotex v.
Catrett' 3—changed the manner in which courts approach summary
judgment, making it easier for defendants to obtain summary judg-
ment in cases of at least arguable discrimination. Before the sum-
mary judgment trilogy, courts had been reluctant to grant summary
judgment to a defendant in a civil rights case where questions of
motive, intent and credibility existed.' 4
1 ° This Article will deal with the two federal statutes most frequently used by employees
to bring discrimination claims against employers: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.-2000e-16
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§621-634. Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, like the ADEA, the parties in a Title VII suit have an explicit right to a
jury trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(c); see also supra note 9. Therefore, after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in both Title VII and ADEA cases, an improper
grant of summary judgment not only substantially reduces the plaintiff's rights to redress a
possible civil rights violation, but also impinges on the right to a jury trial by transferring
power from the jury to a judge.
1 ' 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
13
 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
" See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)) ("Once a prima facie
case is established either by the introduction of actual evidence or reliance on the McDonnell
Douglas presumption, summary judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate
on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is the 'elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.'"); Leonard v. City of Frankfort Elec. & Water
Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 66 (6th
Cir. 1979)) ("The issue . . . of intent or motive was clearly raised by the pleadings and
(plaintiff's] deposition and represented an unresolved issue of material fact which was im-
proper for disposition of summary judgment."); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655,
657 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Hayden v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979))
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Many courts, however, have interpreted the trilogy, although
ambiguous on the issue of pretrial judicial factfinding, to permit
summary judgment in cases where plaintiffs' claims appear weak or
unpersuasive. 15 In response to the trilogy, lower courts have granted
summary judgment in cases where there exist questions of fact
concerning the employer's motive, 16 thereby denying to employ-
ment discrimination'plaintiffs their "day in court" historically prom-
ised by the American model of litigation.
Advocates of the courts' aggressive use of summary judgment
argue that increased use of summary judgment will eliminate friv-
olous claims, and thus free up the courts to decide more meritorious
claims," There is evidence, however, that the courts' more aggres-
(granting summary judgment is especially questionable in employment discrimination cases);
Steck] v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Douglas v. Anderson, 656
F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1981)) ("It is true that courts are generally reluctant to grant summary
judgment in a case in which motivation and intent of a party are at issue."); Conrad v. Delta
Airlines, 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974) (questions of intent or motive are particularly ill-
suited for disposition on summary judgment).
'° Noted legal scholar and Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner in Shager v. Upjohn
Co„ 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990), an employment discrimination case, acknowledged that
growing docket pressures on trial courts make the courts of appeals extremely reluctant to
overrule grants of summary judgments by lower courts "merely because a rational factfinder
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a
practical matter. . . ." Id. at 403. This admission that judges decide cases without trial even
where a rational factfinder could find for the plaintiff after a trial on the merits is as troubling
as it is candid. judge David A. Nelson of the Sixth Circuit seems to agree with Judge Posner's
approach. In what the other judges on the panel considered a "close case," Judge Nelson
made a disturbing admission: "[G]iven the demands now being made on the time of most
district courts, it seems to me that a full-scale trial in a case as lopsided as this one would
probably be a misallocation of judicial resources." Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., 903 F.2d
1064, 1068 (6th Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J., concurring). See also EEOC v. Luckmarr Plastics, Inc.,
884 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment affirmed even though the district court
noted that "this is a close call" and "resolved many disputed facts," because "the EEOC's
evidence was merely colorable"). In Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1219
(3d Cir. 1988), Judge Edward R. Becker "acknowledge[d] that this is a close case," regarding
the balance of persuasion but nonetheless granted summary judgment.
This approach is faulty for two reasons. First, if the case were really so close, a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the defendant is liable. Summary judgment is therefore
improper. Second, the court discounts the resources spent by trial and appeals courts in
deciding summary judgment motions. Parties and judges expend a great deal of time, money
and effort preparing and considering summary judgment motions while many Title VII and
ADEA claims could be resolved by a relatively short, painless, almost irreversible trial. This
remains true even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, granting Title VII
litigants a right to a jury trial. In ADEA cases, where plaintiffs historically have enjoyed a
right to a jury trial, many of the trials are completed in only a few days.
16 See infra Part II-B.
17 See William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions:
A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 441, 451 (1991); see
also Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Or. 1991) ("summary judgment has
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sive use of summary judgment benefits defendants by increasing
plaintiffs' costs and screening out many meritorious lawsuits.' 8
Most troublesome, perhaps, is the profound effect of increased
use of summary judgment in defeating civil rights claims. Although
the Supreme Court certainly wanted lower courts to approach sum-
mary judgment without timidity, many judges treat the trilogy as
an attempt to limit the substantive rights of civil rights plaintiffs, a
reading that distorts both the trilogy and substantive anti-discrimi-
nation law. Following the trilogy, the lower courts have granted
summary judgment more aggressively in civil rights cases, even
though these cases most often turn on subtle questions of credibility
and intent that only a factfinder faced with a live witness should
decide: 9
 This increased use of summary judgment to dispose of
proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby
freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways").
There is also a question whether the increased use of summary judgment to dispose
of claims achieves its goal of unclogging the court system. See Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990). Issacharoff
and Loewenstein explain that the increased use of summary judgment actually discourages
settlement, the most efficient and common method of freeing the court's docket. Id. at 100-
03. Furthermore, when considering whether increased use of summary judgment is more
efficient, the advocates of more aggressive use of summary judgment must also consider
lawyer time expended preparing the summary judgment motions as well as the time saved
by the court by avoiding trial. It seems almost de rigueur for a defendant faced with a
discrimination claim to file a summary judgment motion, whereas previously defendants may
have discussed settlement more freely instead of moving for summary judgment.
19 Probably due to the political composition of the federal bench, even before the trilogy,
a number of courts seemed headed toward the improper use of summary judgment in
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Foster v. Arcata Assocs., 772 F.2d 1453, 1461, 1466-67 (9th
Cir. 1985) (in age and sex discrimination case for failure to promote, even though plaintiff
raised an issue of fact regarding her qualifications, court weighed evidence in favor of
defendant, concluding that the articulated reason not to promote was legitimate.); Matthews
v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiff to prove defendant
"more likely than not" fired plaintiff because of his age at summary judgment stage, rather
than merely raise a genuine issue of material fact); Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239,
242 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding employer's
legitimate expectations of plaintiff's sales record in a period of economic decline).
This Article is not the result of an empirical study and therefore cannot claim to establish
certain cause and effect between the trilogy and the overly aggressive granting of summary
judgment in the lower courts. Whichever came first, the lower courts have used the trilogy
to justify their decisions to grant summary judgment aggressively in discrimination cases. See
infra note 111. Furthermore, practitioners in civil rights firms saw a difference in the fre-
quency with which defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted after the trilogy
was decided. See Jane L. Dolkart, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts After the Supreme
Court Trilogy, 18 BARRISTER MAG. 48, 50 (Summer 1991). A study by the Federal Judicial
Center does not refute the conclusion that the trilogy encouraged defendants in civil rights
claims to bring, and the courts to grant, more summary judgment motions following the





civil rights actions has deprived plaintiffs of the fairer, more accu-
rate decision-making assured by a factfinder's decision at trial.
Part I of this Article describes the methods of proving discrim-
ination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), the two federal statutes employees use most fre-
quently to sue employers for discrimination. 20 Part II examines
recent changes in summary judgment law and their effects on em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs. 2 ' Part III offers a proposal for
improving summary judgment doctrine in employment discrimi-
nation claims, a proposal that preserves plaintiffs' right to trial while
respecting defendants' legitimate rights and the judicial system's
efficiency concerns. 22
This proposal encourages courts deciding motions for sum-
mary judgment in employment discrimination claims to employ a
different approach from that used in deciding summary judgment
motions in other civil suits. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby requires courts
to consider the substantive law when ruling on motions for summary
judgment. 25 Courts must apply the construct set forth in McDonnell
Douglas. Corp. v. Green24 which defines the proper allocation of bur-
dens of proof and production in employment discrimination cases.
Proper application of the McDonnell Douglas standard requires
courts to impose a heightened burden on discrimination defendants
moving for summary judgment. In ruling on whether a defendant
has met this heightened burden, courts should use a sliding-scale
approach. That is, the quantum and quality of the defendant's
evidence should govern the quantum and quality of the evidence
needed for a plaintiff to defeat the motion.
I. PROVING DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER FEDERAL LAW: TITLE
VII AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Congress enacted Title VI1 25 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
"to eliminate, through utilization of formal and informal remedial
20 See infra notes 25-69 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 70-198 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 199-241 and accompanying text.
" 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). See infra Part 11-A-1.
" 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973). See infra Part I-B.
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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procedures,2" discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion, or national origin." 27 In essence, Title VII makes it unlaw-
ful for employers to discriminate against any individual in hiring,
in discharging or "with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. . . . "28
In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress stressed
that equal employment opportunity is a basic right in this country.
The legislature noted that the other civil rights the Act guaranteed
would be meaningless without the right to "gain the economic where-
withal to enjoy or properly utilize them." 29
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1988).
26 Title VII created the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
and delegated to it primary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful and
discriminatory employment practices. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5(a) (1988). The EEOC
is charged with investigating complaints of unlawful discrimination. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Once
it has investigated the complaints, the EEOC issues an opinion that there is or is not reasonable
cause to believe the charge is true. Id. Whether the EEOC finds reasonable cause or not, 180
days after filing with the EEOC, but after receiving a right to sue letter from that agency,
the complainant has a right to file a complaint in federal court which will treat the complaint
de novo. Id. § 2000e-5(f). Before the amendments to Title VII, known as the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, were enacted into law on November 21, 1991, it was generally accepted that parties
in a Title VII suit did not have a right to a jury trial. See Matthew F. Davis, Comment, Beyond
the Dicta: The Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by feny Under Title VII, 38 KAN. L. REV. 1003,
1016 & nn.125-26 (1990). The 1991 Act specifically grants plaintiffs the right to collect
damages, and where such damages are sought, both parties may demand a jury trial. See
supra notes 8, 9, 10 and accompanying text.
27 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355,
2401. As originally envisioned, Title VII would not prohibit sex discrimination. Congress
included sex as a protected class, at the last minute on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives. 110 CONG. REC. 2,577-84 (1964).
2" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1988).
2g H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2516 (1964).
The House Report stated:
Aside from the political and economic considerations, however, we believe in
the creation of job equality because it is the right thing to do. We believe in the
inherent dignity of man. He is born with certain inalienable rights. His unique-
ness is such that we refuse to treat him as if his rights and well-being are
bargainable. All vestiges of inequality based solely on race must be removed in
order to preserve our democratic society, to maintain our country's leadership,
and to enhance mankind.
Id. at 2517.
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The ADEA3° was enacted "to promote the employment of older
workers based on their ability."" Congress modeled the ADEA on
two existing federal statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). 32 Substantively, the
language of the ADEA closely resembles that of Title VII. The
courts uniformly apply Title VII substantive law to ADEA cases."
Procedurally, however, the ADEA follows the FLSA. 34
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The ADEA, in its relevant part, makes it unlawful for an
employer:
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
Act.
Id. § 623(a).
'' H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2213,
2214. In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress was aware that older persons were
discriminated against in the workplace. Id. Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act directed the
Secretary of Labor to study the problem of age discrimination in employment. Id. In June,
1965, the Secretary of Labor acknowledged that age discrimination in employment was
rampant and called for a clear-cut federal policy that would provide a basis for a vigorous
nationwide campaign to promote hiring without discrimination on the basis of age. Id.
Congress responded by passing Section 606 of The Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1966. See H.R. REP. No. 805, reprinted in 1967 U,S.C.C.A.N. 2214. This section directed
the Secretary to submit "his specific legislative recommendations for implementing the con-
clusions and recommendations contained in his report on age discrimination in employment
made pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964]." Id.
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). The Fair Labor Standards Act addresses "labor condi-
tions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.. . ." Id. § 202(a).
"See, e.g., Owen v. Penton Publishing Inc., No. 91-3744, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 8982,
at *14 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1992) (generally, the court applies the analysis used for Title VII
discrimination cases to ADEA cases pursuant to McDonnell Douglas Carp.); Johnson v. Min-
nesota Hist. Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Raise!! v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982)) ("guidelines set forth in McDonnell Douglas are
applicable to cases arising under the ADEA"); Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1556
(I Ith Cir. 1987) ("In age discrimination cases, this circuit has elected to follow a burden of
proof scheme substantially similar to that established for Title VII cases. . . ."); Williams v.
Edward Apffels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Satisfaction of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas criteria is sufficient to establish a prima facie case" under the ADEA.).
54 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). A Title VII complainant must file charges with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988). Before
initiating a civil suit, however, a Title VII claimant must wait 180 days while the EEOC
considers the complaint. See id. 2000e-5(f)(1). If, after that time, the Commission has not
reached a conciliation agreement with the employer, has not initiated a suit, has not taken
action or has dismissed the complaint, the claimant may request a notice of a right to sue (a
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The methods of proof under Title VII and the ADEA are
virtually identical. Under both statutes, plaintiffs can prove their
case by direct or circumstantial evidence or both. Where direct
evidence is lacking, the courts employ a burden-shifting approach
first recognized in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 35 Employment
discrimination plaintiffs may proceed on two different theories.
Plaintiffs who allege disparate treatment must prove that their em-
ployers intentionally discriminated against them because of their
right to sue letter) from the EEOC. Id. The right to sue letter authorizes a claimant to bring
a civil action within 90 days of its receipt. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (1991). if the claimant
requests a right to sue letter within the 180 days, the EEOC, in its discretion, may issue a
letter if it determines it will be unable to complete administrative processing of the charge
within the 180 days. Id.
Although an ADEA claimant must also file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days
after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, it need not apply for a right to sue letter in
order to bring a civil action. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(d) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1626.7 (1989). The
ADEA claimant must wait 60 days after filing the charges with the EEOC to commence suit.
42 U.S.C. § 626(d). If the EEOC commences an action to enforce the claimant's rights, the
right to bring an individual action terminates. Id. § 626(c)(1).
The ADEA provides two alternative routes for federal employees pursuing a claim. The
claimant can invoke the EEOC's administrative process and then file a civil action if unsatisfied
with the results, or bring a civil action after giving the EEOC not less than 30 days notice of
an intent to file suit. Stevens v. Department of the Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562, 1566 (1991)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b)(c)). See also Emily J. Lawrence, Casenote, Clarifying the Timing
Requirements for Federal Employees' Age Discrimination Claims: Stevens v. Department of the
Treasury, 33 B.C. L. REV. 396 (1992).
It appears that Congress chose to create a new act to protect older employees from age
discrimination rather than to amend Title VII, at least in part, to avoid overtaxing the EEOC.
See Kimberly Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by
Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 606 & n.29 (1987). This choice, however, has
encouraged some commentators to argue that Congress intended to give less protection to
age discrimination victims than to victims of race, sex or national origin discrimination. Id.
at 605 & n.26.
Because the ADEA's legislative antecedents include the FLSA as well as Title VII,
plaintiffs suing under the ADEA actually have greater rights than those enjoyed by plaintiffs
suing under Title VII. For example, courts had uniformly interpreted Tide VII before its
1991 amendment as not providing a right to a jury trial, while a plaintiff bringing suit under
the AREA always had the right to a jury trial. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text.
See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-82 (1978) (granting right to a jury trial for
ADEA plaintiff seeking monetary damages because a plaintiff suing under the FLSA has a
right to a jury trial and the ADEA was derived procedurally from the FLSA). In response
to the Supreme Court decision, Congress amended the ADEA in 1978 expressly to include
a right to a jury trial. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988),
In addition, the ADEA provides for double damages where a defendant willfully violated
the Act. Id. Section 626(b) states that "liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of
willful violations of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Historically, there has been no such
provision under Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, provides the plaintiff a
right to collect limited punitive damages. See Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102(6)(3), 105 Stat. 1072-
73 (amending § 1977 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding § 1977A(b)(3)).
Ss
	 U.S. 792 (1973). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
March 1993]	 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 	 213
age, race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Plaintiffs who pro-
ceed under a disparate impact theory must prove that facially neu-
tral employment criteria have a disparate, adverse impact on a
protected group. In proving a disparate impact claim, individual
plaintiffs or a class of plaintiffs need not prove that the employer
intentionally discriminated. Rather, plaintiffs will prevail if they can
prove, through the use of statistics, that facially neutral criteria,
such as requiring a high school diploma, will have an adverse impact
on the plaintiffs' class."
To illustrate both how the courts currently treat discrimination
plaintiffs, and this author's proposal for change, this Article will
refer throughout to a hypothetical plaintiff, Connie Computer, who
brings a sex discrimination suit against MBI for failure to hire her.
In the hypothetical, Connie Computer is a twenty-eight-year-old
white female who applies to MBI for an advertised position selling
computers. Ms. Computer has a Bachelor of Arts degree in business
and three years' experience selling computers for MBI's competi-
tors. The advertisement states that MBI is looking for someone with
a Bachelor of Arts degree in business and at least three years'
experience selling computers. MBI does not hire Connie, but gives
the position to Noel Knownothing, a white male, age thirty. Ms.
Computer sues MBI alleging that MBI violated Title VII by dis-
criminating against her because of her sex.
A. Proof by Direct Evidence: Smoking Guns?
Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs can prove by direct evidence
that defendants discriminated against them, just as plaintiffs in any
other civil case would prove their cause of action." For example, if
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of the different
burdens between disparate treatment and disparate impact cases as they were understood
before the Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), see John
F. Smith, III, Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens
of Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372 (1982). Most commentators agreed that there was little or nothing
left of the disparate impact theory of discrimination after Wards Cove. See David 0. Stewart,
Civil Rights: Just a Trim?, 75 ABA J. 40 (Aug. 1989) (asserting Wards Cove "in effect overrules
Griggs . . . in which the court required employers to justify employment policies that were
shown by statistics to have a 'disparate impact' on minorities"); see also Pamela L. Perry, Two
Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991); Mack A. Player, Is
Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA, Sr. U. L.
Rev. 1 (1989). But see The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 320,
341-61 (1989) (arguing Wards Cove clarifies Griggs). The disparate impact theory has been
revived to some extent by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
" There is some controversy as to what constitutes direct evidence in the discrimination
context. Some courts and commentators consider direct evidence to be any evidence that
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in our hypothetical case, MBI tells Connie Computer that it will not
hire her because "women don't make good salesmen," Ms. Com-
puter can prove by direct evidence that MBI refused to hire her
because of illegitimate motives. Likewise, where an employer dis-
charges an older individual because "old folks can't manage as well
as younger employees," the plaintiff can prove illegal age discrimi-
nation." As defendants become increasingly sophisticated about
the law," these admissions occur very rarely. Plaintiffs therefore
normally use circumstantial evidence to prove their Title VII and
ADEA cases.
B. Proof by Circumstantial Evidence: The McDonnell Douglas
Formula
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,•° Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters• and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,• 2 the
establishes that the employer has a prejudice against the protected class of which plaintiff is
a member. For example, if defendant makes numerous remarks in the workplace such as,
"Women are not as loyal workers as men," or, "Hispanics are lazy," some courts and com-
mentators would argue that when a woman or an Hispanic is discharged, these comments
are direct evidence of discriminatory motive. See EEOC v. M.D. Pneumatics, Inc., 779 F.2d
21, 22 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding sub silentio the district court's conclusion that stray remarks
such as, "It's going to be a cold day in hell before we really have women in this plant,"
constituted direct evidence of discrimination). Other courts would require that the comments
be causally linked to the particular decision in question. That is, only if the employer tells
the woman he is firing her (or refusing to promote her) because "women are not as loyal
workers as men," or if he tells the Hispanic that he is making his adverse employment
decision against him because "Hispanics are lazy," would these courts consider these com-
ments direct evidence of discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d
1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) ("one example of direct evidence would be a scrap of paper
saying 'fire Rollins—she is too old!,"' but without evidence of a causal connection it is not
direct evidence); Robinson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 823 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir. 1987)
(requiring plaintiff to show "strong, direct evidence of intentional discrimination" through
evidence of racial remarks); Maxfield v. Sinclair Intl, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Direct evidence would include statements by the employer to the employee that s/he was
being fired because of age."). This latter view is probably more supportable under traditional
rules of evidence. See IA JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 948
( James Chadbourn ed., 1981). It also comports with Justice O'Connor's view in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stray discriminatory
remarks in the workplace are not sufficient to create a Title VII claim). See infra note 63 and
accompanying text. But see Beshears v. Ashbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (while
Price Waterhouse defines direct evidence negatively to exclude stray remarks, "this court has
held that direct evidence may include evidence of actions or remarks of the employer that
reflect a discriminatory attitude").
55
 See, e.g., infra note 63 and accompanying text for examples of the evidence courts
will consider.
59 See infra note 45 and accompanying text for one commentator's view.
a° 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
'' 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
42 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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Supreme Court explained a three-stage method of allocating bur-
dens of persuasion and production" in a Title VII case where the
plaintiff attempts to prove discrimination by circumstantial evi-
dence." Because a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the dis-
parate treatment theory must prove that the defendant intended to
discriminate, and intent is generally difficult to prove absent a smok-
ing gun,45 the Court departed from the traditional order of proof
in a civil case.46
1. The Prima Facie Case
According to McDonnell Douglas, our hypothetical Title VII
plaintiff, Connie Computer, makes out a prima facie case of dis-
45 While often the courts confuse burdens of persuasion and production, the terms refer
to two very different burdens. A party with the burden of production, as the term implies,
has the burden of going forward to produce evidence supporting his or her version of the
facts. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 4, at 620 (citing I X JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 283, 294 ( James Chadbourn ed., 1981)). A party with the burden
of persuasion, however, must come forth with sufficient evidence to persuade the factfinder
of the truth of those facts for which the party has the burden. Id. Under the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine model, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion throughout the trial and
the defendant has the burden of production only to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case.
See infra notes 46, 47 and accompanying text.
"'[his method has been applied consistently to AREA cases as well. See supra note 33
and infra note 48 and accompanying text.
45 Employers have become increasingly adept at protecting themselves from discrimi-
nation lawsuits, It is rare for an employer to make a direct statement to an employee such
as, "I can't hire a woman for this job." See Iris Taylor, Law Council Official Prods Companies on
Hiring, Interviewing, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, June 12, 1991, at 41.
46 See Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Go., 821 F.2(1 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987) ("McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine patterns of proof were designed to ease the evidentiary burdens on employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate enough to have access to direct
evidence of intentional discrimination."). See also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 4, at 622-23.
According to Kovacic-Fleischer, the courts should consider various factors in determining
how to allocate burdens of persuasion and production. Those factors are policy, convenience,
fairness and probability.
Policy issues include factors such as burdening the plaintiff because the person
seeks to change the status quo or burdening the defendant when certain de-
fenses are disfavored or unusual. Included under convenience and fairness
issues are factors such as who has knowledge and access to information and
whether the.burden follows the natural order of storytelling.
Id. But see Phyllis Trapper Bautnann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration
of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 211, 236-38 (1992) (arguing
that "the Court, pursuing its pro-defendant vision of title VII, placed only a minimum
production burden on the defendant," and suggesting procedural choices the court might
have employed).
" The Supreme Court in Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine noted the distinction
between the meaning of prima facie case as referred to in McDonnell Douglas and the
traditional understanding of the term. 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). In the Title VII and
ADEA contexts, a prima facie case refers to the plaintiff's burden at the first stage of
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crimination, the first step in proving discrimination, by demonstrat-
ing:
1) that she is a member of a protected class (women);
2) that she applied for and was qualified for the job (she
met the posted qualifications);
3) that MB1 did not hire her; and
4) that MBI hired Noel Knownothing, who is not a mem-
ber of the protected class, to fill the position. (If MBI had
not hired Mr. Knownothing, Ms. Computer could satisfy
this requirement by demonstrating that MBI continued to
look for a person to fill the position after rejecting Ms.
Corn pu ter.) 48
Once Ms. Computer successfully demonstrates these four elements
of a prima facie case, the court presumes that MBI is guilty of
intentional discrimination. If MBI presents no evidence at trial in
response to Connie Computer's prima facie case, and Connie moves
for a directed verdict, she will prevail. The presumption that MB1
intentionally discriminated against Connie Computer, once she
proves a prima facie case, efficiently furthers the Title VII policy
litigation. It refers to the proof needed to shift the burden of production to the employer
to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision.
In other words, it refers to the burden required to trigger a presumption that defendant
acted in a discriminatory manner. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. A prima facie
case traditionally refers to the material elements of a plaintiff's case that must be substantiated
to survive dismissal or summary judgment. Many courts, in addressing defendant's motion
for summary judgment in the Title VII and ADEA context confuse these meanings of prima
facie case. See Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1226 (3d Cir. 1988) (Shapiro,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the import of Celotex and Liberty Lobby is that the non-moving
party is held to a higher level of proof at the prima facie stage, and that "[n]either case gives
a judge the authority to assess the strength of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses'
affidavits once the prima facie case . [is] established"). For an excellent discussion of the
differences and the implications of the confusion, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 4, at 628.
48
 The basic elements of a prima fade case apply to ADEA as well as Title VII cases. See
supra note 33. The criteria for both ADEA and Title VII will vary somewhat depending on
whether the basis of the complaint is a discharge or the failure to promote rather than to
hire. Compare Mathew v, Virginia Union Univ., No. 91-2593, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5450,
at *10 (4th Cir. Mar. 27, 1992) (citing Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery
Community College, 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1991)) (in a Title VII failure to promote
case, plaintiff must show: "(I) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied for the
promotion and tenure; (3) he was qualified for promotion and tenure; and (4) he was rejected
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination" to make out a
prima facie case) with EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing
EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1982)) (to demonstrate a prima
facie case in an ADEA discharge claim, claimant must demonstrate: "(1) he is a member of
a protected class, (2) he was discharged, (3) at the time of discharge, he was performing at
a satisfactory level, meeting his employer's legitimate expectations, and (4) following his
discharge, he was replaced by a person outside the protected class").
March 1993]	 SUMMARY JUDGMENT	 217
of eliminating illegal discrimination in the workplace. It makes it
easier for Connie to prove her case while respecting MBI's need to
eliminate frivolous lawsuits.
The Supreme Court recognized the inherent difficulty of prov-
ing discriminatory intent when it adopted the presumption created
by McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. 49 Plaintiffs in disparate treat-
ment cases must prove that defendants acted with discriminatory
intent, an "elusive factual question"" that is difficult to prove absent
a "smoking gun." 51 The presumption raised by the prima facie case
therefore gives the plaintiff the opportunity to flesh out the facts. 52
Most plaintiffs will not have access to evidence of motive or intent,
should any exist."
The McDonnell Douglas construct also screens out frivolous suits
by requiring that Connie be a member of a protected class, be at
least minimally qualified for the position, apply for a position and
be rejected by MBI. Moreover, the fourth requirement—that MBI
fill the position with a person who is not a member of the protected
class or continue to seek other applicants for the position—gives
rise to an inference that MBI has acted with discriminatory ani-
mus. 54
49 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Burdine, 450 U.S. at '255 n.13.
51 See Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum J., with
Bauer & Cudahy, JJ., dissenting) (citing Holzman v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 916 F.2d 1298, 1303
(7th Cir. 1990)) ("Just as age discrimination cases rarely present the trier of fact with a
'smoking gun,' they rarely present the district courts with evidence that points inescapably
to the conclusion that there is no question of material fact concerning the role age played in
. [the] decision to . . . terminate. . . ."); Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1175
(1st Cir. 1991) ("Proof along these lines need not be of the 'smoking gun' variety and, in
some factual settings, the mere showing of the falsity of the employer's stated reasons may,
along with the other facts and circumstances in the case, give rise to a reasonable inference
of age discrimination."); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1526 (3d Cir. 1988) ("The
evidence of that intent need not be so direct and uncontrovertible as 'smoking gun' evidence
to compel a rebuttal by the defendant, and to require that rebuttal be substantive and not
mere pretext.") (emphasis in original). See also Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d
184, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (Mansmann, J., dissenting); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co.,
895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990); Clements v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 821 F.2d 489,
491 (8th Cir, 1987).
52 See Green, 843 F.2d at 1527 ("The requirement of the prima facie showing was intended
as a working tool to provide a means to determine which cases raise sufficiently compelling
inferences of discrimination to require rebuttal, It was not intended as a hallmark of whether
the complainant has proved his or her case.") (emphasis in original).
" See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima fade case is to compensate for the fact
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by"). See also Taylor, supra
note 45, at 41.
" Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1988) illustrates the protection
the fourth McDonnell Douglas prong gives an employer. In Goldberg, the court affirmed the
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2. Defendant's Burden of Production
After Connie Computer makes out a prima facie case, the
second stage of the suit occurs. The burden of production shifts to
MBI to "articulate a legitimate, 55 non-discriminatory reason"56 for
hiring Noel Knownothing over Connie Computer. The rationale
for the plaintiff's victory if the defendant cannot articulate a legit-
imate, non-discriminatory reason for the hiring decision is that
employers normally act rationally unless motivated by an illegal
prejudicial motive."
MB1 can satisfy its burden by having its personnel director
testify that it hired Mr. Knownothing because he was better qualified
than Connie Computer. The burden now shifts to the plaintiff.
Because Connie Computer has the ultimate burden of persuasion,
if she puts nothing into evidence, the defendant will prevail."
3. Plaintiff's Proof of Pretext
At the third and final stage of the suit, once MB I has articulated
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selecting Mr. Knowno-
thing over the plaintiff, she must have a "full and fair opportunity"
lower court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff did not
make out a prima facie case. He demonstrated no direct or circumstantial evidence of age
discrimination and he could not meet the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement because he
was replaced by a man who was six years older than he. See also Young v. General Foods
Corp., 840 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1988) discussed infra note 235.
55
 'Legitimate" has not been interpreted by the courts to have a meaning other than
"non-discriminatory." See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1115 n.38. It seems odd that the Court,
in defining the defendant's burden of production, would not have used the word "legitimate"
to mean something different from, and in addition to, non-discriminatory. Likewise, it would
make sense to interpret legitimate to require the employer to demonstrate that its motive
was something in addition to non-discriminatory. Assuming that the Court intended legiti-
mate to mean something more than non-discriminatory, perhaps the Court originally in-
tended that the lower courts look a little more closely at the adequacy of the employer's
reason for the adverse employment decision. See Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the
Maze.. Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 419, 437 (1982). Bui see Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrim-
ination Cases, 43 HAS'rlNcs L.J. 57, 136-40 (1991) (concluding that courts have argued that
the defendants should have a "rational business reason" for their terminations of plaintiffs
in order to fulfill the "legitimate" requirement, and arguing that any reason, including an
illegal one, should suffice to meet defendant's burden).
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
57 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
58 Although this approach may work at trial, there is a serious question whether a court
should grant summary judgment motions against plaintiffs who present no evidence in
response to a mere articulation that they were not as well qualified as the person hired. See
discussion following Case One, infra Part 111-B.
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to rebut the defendant's proffered reason for the hiring decision."
In order to prevail at trial, Ms. Computer must prove that the
defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. At this
point the plaintiff's burden to prove pretext merges with her ulti-
mate burden of persuasion." That is, if Connie Computer proves
that MBI's proffered reason is pretextual, she wins the case. 61
According to Burdine, 62 Ms. Computer has two avenues by
which she can prove that the defendant discriminated against her.
Suppose the defendant's proffered reason for rejecting her is that
Mr. Knownothing is better qualified. The company representative,
however, told Ms. Computer at her job interview that MBI found
that women had a difficult time in the computer sales
division because their understanding of technical language is infe-
rior to that of men. Ms. Computer could then establish by direct
evidence that it was more likely than not that the company re-
jected her because she was a woman. If', however, the employer
made no such statements, Ms. Computer could meet
her burden of proof indirectly by demonstrating that Mr.
Knownothing was not better qualified than she. In other words,
Ms. Computer will have proven by either of these methods that
defendant's proffered reason for not hiring her was pretextual. 63
w McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
00 Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
61 See infra note 64.
02 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
63 In determining whether plaintiffs have met their burden of proof, courts arc free to
consider a variety of types of circumstantial evidence. A factfinder may consider whether the
employer's selection or promotion methods lead to arbitrary results because they lack objec-
tive standards or procedures. See Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 753 (4th Cir.
1986). The factfinder can also consider evidence of the general atmosphere in the workplace.
Evidence of company policies or practices that have historically limited opportunity for, or
led to harassment of, members of a protected group arc relevant to whether the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, there are two troubling trends regarding evidence of racial or gender
harassment in the workplace. First, some courts have held that evidence of "stray remarks"
in the workplace that are offensive are not sufficient in themselves to create a genuine issue
of material fact. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("Remarks
at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part
in a particular employment decision."). See also Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379
(5th Cir, 1991) ("stray remarks" alone were insufficient to establish discrimination); Gagne
v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1989) ("solitary remark" insuffi..
cient to preclude summary judgment). But see Beshears v. Ashbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th
Cir. 1991) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (interpreting
Price Waterhouse to mean that "[Ointments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus .. .
or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions may constitute direct
evidence.. .").
The second troubling trend is that courts often hold that racist or sexist statements are
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Once the plaintiff can make this showing, she wins the
case."
The Court initially sculpted the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine ap-
proach with the trial setting in mind. 65
 The purpose of allowing the
not probative of discriminatory intent unless they are made by the decisionmaker, the person
who took the allegedly discriminatory action against the plaintiff. See Williams v. Williams
Elecs., Inc., 856 F.2d 920, 922, 925 (7th Cir. 1988) (that "some of [plaintiff's] fellow techni-
cians had said that a black person should not be working as an electronics technician, was
not direct evidence of discrimination" because "[n]one of these individuals were involved in
the layoff decision"). See also Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications, 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th
Cir. 1989) (citing Furr v. AT&T Tech., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 1987)). These cases
ignore the power an employer has in eliminating racism from its workforce by not permitting
racist remarks or incidents to take place. See Daniel Goleman, New Way to Battle Bias: Fight
Acts, Not Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991, at Cl. Furthermore, management's tolerance of
such remarks may permit an inference that management holds (and acts upon) similar views.
A plaintiff may also prove his or her case by the use of statistical evidence. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-43 (1977). From a statistical
disparity of two or three standard deviations from the norm between the number of qualified
members of a protected class and the number of qualified members of a non-protected class
in the workplace, a reasonable jury can infer that the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff, a member of a non-protected class. Id. at 338-40.
44
 The majority of jurisdictions interpret Burdine to require only that a plaintiff prove
the defendant's reason is unworthy of belief in order to meet his or her burden of persuasion.
See Chippolini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1987). The First Circuit,
however, requires additional evidence of discriminatory animus before the plaintiff will
prevail. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816. 829 (1st Cir. 1991); Samuels v.
Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991); Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d
1169, 1178 (Ist Cir. 1991). According to the First Circuit, the plaintiff is "required to do
more than simply refute or cast doubt' on the employer's rationale. He must also 'show a
discriminatory animus based on age.'" Id. at 1172 (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)), But see Rossy v. Roche Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 621,
625 (1st Cir. 1989) (following majority approach).
The Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, in some cases, have required additional
evidence of discriminatory animus, but the additional evidence rule is not well established in
these circuits yet. See Lanctot, supra note 55, at 82-86 nn.92-97. See also Guthrie, 941 F.2d at
379 (requiring plaintiff to specifically disprove, not merely rebut, defendant's articulated
reason to terminate). This author agrees with Professor Lanctot's premise that Burdine
requires that the plaintiff prevail upon proving that the defendant's legitimate, non-discrim-
inatory articulated reason is false without any additional showing of pretext. To the extent
Professor Lanctot argues that the requirement of proving discriminatory animus in addition
to pretext (the "pretext-plus" rule) is the sole, or even the primary cause of improper
decisions, I disagree. The courts in all jurisdictions, including those that do not apply the
pretext-plus rule, have at some time usurped the factfinder's role in discrimination cases
where defendants have moved for summary judgment. This Article argues that it is the
courts' misapplication of the summary judgment standard that causes this usurpation. The
pretext-plus rule only compounds the problem because it leads to an increased misuse of
summary judgment.
B' When the parties allege that the defendant had mixed motives for its employment
decision, the McDonnell Douglas allocation of burdens of proof will not apply because there
will be at least one illegitimate reason for the adverse employment decision which the
defendant argues is not the "but for" cause of its decision. The defendant will seek to prove
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defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the hiring decision is to "meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by
presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."°6 Thus, when
formulating the approach, the Supreme Court contemplated that
the defendant's "articulation" would set up a factual question for
the factfinder to determine at trial after hearing all the evidence.°
Courts have uniformly applied the McDonnell DouglasIBurdine
approach to summary judgment.," and rightfully so. In adapting
the approach to the summary judgment setting, however, many
courts, particularly those deciding motions following the summary
judgment trilogy, have misapplied the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
teSt. 69
II. THE "NEW" SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
A. The Summary Judgment Trilogy
1. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to
consider the evidentiary standard in a libel case when determining
whether to grant summary judgment. 7° The Court concluded that
the federal courts must consider the substantive evidentiary stan-
that it would have made the adverse decision anyway in the absence of illegitimate factors.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 239-53 (1989) (if the plaintiff can prove that the employer
had used impermissible factors in reaching its decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision absent its consideration of illegitimate factors).
"' Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
,rd.
58 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127-28 (lot Cir. 1991); Visser
v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., with Bauer & Cudahy,
JJ., dissenting); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1990); Jackson
v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1987). In fact, courts are grappling
with the burden-shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage more frequently than ever
as summary judgment has emerged as the predominant "battleground for employers seeking
to avoid discrimination trials." Lanctot, supra note 55, at 67 n.38.
69 See discussion infra Part. II-B.
79 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986). FED. H. Cw. P. 56 provides that a litigant can obtain summary
judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in this uncontested factual context.
222	 BOSTON COI I EGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:203
dards that apply to the case when ruling on summary judgment
motions.'' Thus, after Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, there should be no
doubt that the McDonnell Douglas construct will apply at the sum-
mary judgment phase.
The Liberty Lobby Court equated the inquiry a district judge
makes when hearing a summary judgment motion to that which
the trial court makes when faced with a directed verdict 'motion."
Accordingly, in determining whether to grant a defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion in a libel case where plaintiff is a public
figure," the Court held that the lower court must decide whether
there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence. 74
Although the Supreme Court in Liberty Lobby claimed that it
was not changing the law but merely clarifying it,7 ' many scholars
believe that the decision was a significant adjustment of previous
summary judgment law." The Court's language forbids judges from
assessing a witness's credibility and from weighing the evidence,"
but the holding—that a judge must determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict for the non-movant-
encourages, if not requires, judges to weigh the evidence."
" Id. at 252.
72 Id. at 250. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 gives the court the power to direct a verdict.
"See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
74
 477 U.S. at 255-56.
75 justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, expresses his concern that the majority
"purports to restate the summary judgment test, but with each repetition, the original
understanding is increasingly distorted." Id. at 265 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
76 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 18 at 73, 118; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 144-50, 193 (1988); D. Michael Risinger, Another
Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to
Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. Ray. 35, 35-43 (1988); Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's
Conquest? Reflection on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prm-.
L. Rev. 725, 739-42 (1989). But see Schwarzer et al, supra note 17, at 487; Jack H. Friedenthal,
Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 770, 771, 787 (1988); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of
Burden, 10 Am. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 433, 437, 474-75 (1987).
77 "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legiti-
mate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge...." 477 U.S. at 255.
" But see Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 488-89. Weighing the evidence at the
summary judgment stage can be especially problematic where there is a heightened eviden-
tiary standard as there was in Liberty Lobby. For example, in Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746
F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984), then-appellate Judge Scalia stated:
Imposing the increased proof requirement at this stage would change the
threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of facts
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Furthermore, the Court stated that a plaintiff faced with a
properly supported summary judgment motion must present affir-
mative evidence to defeat the motion, even when the evidence is
within the possession of the defendant, assuming the plaintiff has
had an opportunity to conduct discovery." Plaintiffs cannot rely
merely on their cross-examinations of the defendants in order to
destroy their credibility, but must present concrete evidence of the
defendants' lack of credibility in response to summary judgment
motions."
2. Celotex v. Catrett
In Celotex v. Catrett, the Court granted certiorari to determine
exactly what burden the defendant had when moving for summary
judgment." The administratrix of the plaintiff's estate had filed
suit against an asbestos manufacturer, alleging in the wrongful
death suit that the decedent had been exposed to asbestos manu-
factured by defendant." After discovery, the defendant moved for
summary judgment but did not file an affidavit in support of its
motion." Rather, the defendant's motion simply asserted that there
was no evidence in the record, as established through discovery,
that the decedent had been exposed to a product manufactured by
the defendant." The district court granted summary judgment. 85
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the defendant had an
affirmative duty to negate the possibility that the decedent had been
exposed to the defendant's product." The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. It held that where the defendant is the movant on a summary
judgment motion, it is sufficient for the defendant to point out to
supporting plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it
would seem) of the weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts as
well.... In other words, disposing of a summary judgment motion would rarely
be the relatively quick process it is supposed to be.
19 4 7 7 U.S. at 250 n.5 ("we assume that both parties have had ample opportunity for
discovery").
"° Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1570 (an increased burden on plaintiff would effectively
force plaintiff to "try his entire case in pretrial affidavits and depositions—marshalling for
the court all the facts supporting his case, and seeking to contest as many of the defendant's
facts as possible").
RI 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
B2 Id.
88
 Id, at 319-20.
84 Id, at 320.
es Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.
86 Id. at 321.
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the district court "that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case." 87
Before Celotex, a defendant bringing a motion for summary
judgment had the burden of proving the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact. Yet the Celotex majority appeared to rule that
defendants need not prove the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact to meet their initial burden." Justice White, however,
who joined the majority opinion but also wrote a separate concur-
rence, clearly stated in his opinion that it is not sufficient for the
movant to move for summary judgment "without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff
has no evidence to prove his case."89 He concluded that the plaintiff
need not initiate discovery by deposing his or her own witnesses or
by producing their affidavits if the defendant has merely asserted
in a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff has failed to
produce support for his or her case." Rather, "[i]t is the defendant's
task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit."9 '
87 Id. at 325. This language implies that the moving party who does not have the burden
of persuasion at trial need not conduct discovery on the questions raised in the pleadings.
Thus, if the plaintiff had not created a record demonstrating a valid case, theoretically, the
defendant would meet its burden on the motion by pointing to the absence of facts in the
record that support the plaintiff's case. This is an odd standard given the reality of practicing
law. Unless otherwise required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has no
incentive to reveal his or her case to the defendant by deposing his or her own witnesses or
by producing affidavits stating the substance of the plaintiff's witnesses' testimony. The
Supreme Court probably did not intend to require a plaintiff to depose his or her own
witnesses in order to create a record to protect his or her case against the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Although there is little surprise left in the way cases are tried in the
federal courts, the Court could not have intended the defendant's summary judgment motion
to be a cheap way to discover the plaintiff's evidence. The Federal Judicial Center interprets
Celotex to require defendants to present differing amounts of proof depending on the thrust
of the motion:
If the motion asserts that the opponent lacks proof to establish a requisite
element of its case, as in Celotex, the movant must show the absence of facts,
usually by producing relevant excerpts from the opponent's discovery responses,
supplemented as needed by affidavits. If the motion purports to negate an
essential element of the nonmovant's case, for example, to establish that no
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant, a more elaborate
showing on affidavits may be necessary.
Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 478.
88 477 U.S. at 323.
89 Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
90 Id.
91
 Id. Celotex may actually deal with no more than a discovery dispute. In fact, the
gravamen of Justice White's opinion is the court of appeals' failure to address the questions
of whether the respondent had failed to produce any basis for her case upon defendant's
"request," and whether the plaintiff had "revealed enough" information about her witnesses
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Because Justice White's vote was necessary to form a majority,
his opinion, rather than the majority's, should define the confines
of the majority's decision. Thus, even before the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to respond to the summary judgment motion, the
defendant must do more than make conclusory assertions that the
plaintiff does not have a case. Exactly what this burden is remains
unclear, however. 92 At the very least, the defendant should be re-
quired to depose witnesses of which the plaintiff has made the
defendant aware before filing the summary judgment motion and,
in its motion, to point to relevant portions of the depositions that
demonstrate an absence of support for the plaintiff's claim."
and evidence to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 328. This discussion in
Justice White's opinion seems muddled. He confuses the defendant's initial burden when
moving for summary judgment that will require a response from the plaintiff with the
plaintiff's burden of responding to the motion once the defendant has met its burden. It
appears that the majority also questioned whether the plaintiff was forthright in her responses
to the defendant's interrogatories and other discovery requests. Id. at 320. The key issue on
summary judgment was whether the plaintiff had any proof that her husband, who had died
of asbestosis, had ever been exposed to the defendant's product. Id. The majority opinion
states that the defendant argued in its motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff had
"failed to identify, in answering interrogatories specifically requesting such information, any
witnesses who could testify about the decedent's exposure to petitioner's asbestos products."
Id. Thus, the Court may have concluded that it would have been more appropriate for the
lower courts to handle a discovery matter. The Court therefore had an incentive to remand
the case to the lower court. See Celotex, 826 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (panel over Bork
dissent refused to affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment, on remand because
record indicated non-deposed witness subject to subpoena had information helpful to plain-
tiff ).
" See generally, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary judgment
After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988). In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604
(11th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff brought an action under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, § 510 (1988). The district court granted the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit in Clark read Celotex
narrowly, stressing that it was the defendant's initial burden to prove the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact when moving for summary judgment. According to the
Eleventh Circuit, the burden does not shift to the plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine
issue of' material fact for trial until the defendant meets its initial burden. See 929 F.2d at
608. The court of appeals criticized the lower court's misreading of Celotex and noted that a
recent empirical study had found that in 60% of cases in which summary judgment had been
entered for the defendant, the district courts had granted the motion without discussing
whether defendant had met its initial burden. Id. at 608-09 it.8 (citing Issacharoff & Loew-
enstein, supra note 18, at 92). In Holmberg v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1387, 1392
n.4 (7th Cir. 1990), however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to reach the
opposite conclusion concerning the import of Celotex.
Professor Nelken suggests that if the plaintiff makes the defendant aware of the existence
of a witness that would support the plaintiff's claim, the defendant is required to depose the
witness before bringing its motion for summary judgment if it hopes to satisfy the defendant's
burden of proof. See Nelken, supra, at 74-75 n.105.
" See Nelken, supra note 92, at 74-75; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
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3. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the court of appeals applied the proper standards in
overturning the district court's grant of summary judgment." The
plaintiffs, two manufacturers of American consumer electronic
products, brought an antitrust suit against a group of Japanese
manufacturers of electronics. The complaint alleged that the defen-
dants had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to engage in a
predatory pricing scheme to sell their products below marginal cost
in the United States in order to establish a market here and to drive
the American manufacturers out of business." The complaint also
alleged that the defendants funded their predatory policy in the
United States by conspiring to sell electronic products at artificially
high prices in Japan."
Disregarding substantial expert witness testimony to the con-
trary, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' theory was economi-
cally implausible and would not support a favorable verdict. 97 The
Court remanded to the Third Circuit, instructing the court of ap-
peals to examine the record to see if sufficient direct evidence
existed to overcome the defendants' right to judgment." Although
Matsushita directed the lower courts not to draw inferences in favor
of the moving party," the Supreme Court in Matsushita did just
that. The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs' theory was not plau-
sible because the defendants had been pricing their products low
for many years.'" This conclusion ignored the testimony of the
plaintiffs' expert witnesses who averred that Japanese business ex-
ecutives approach such issues differently from the way Americans
do.'°' The Court assumed that Japanese entrepreneurs conduct
business in a manner similar to that of Americans, an assumption
Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), which supports the more liberal reading of Celotex. Kodak
stated that the defendant, when moving for summary judgment in an antitrust claim, had a
"substantial burden" to show it is entitled to summary judgment. See infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986).
95 /d. at 578.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 594 n.I9, 597.
98 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598, on remand, In re Japanese Eke. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807
F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 481 U.S.
1029 (1987).
99 1d. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
m° Id. at 590-91.
101 Id. at 594 & n,19.
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contrary to the plaintiffs' expert testimony. 102 By examining the
plausibility of the plaintiffs' theory, the Court seemed to instruct
the lower courts to weigh the evidence and to decide which infer-
ence was more reasonable in light of the evidence. This had tradi-
tionally been a function of the factfinder.'" The Matsushita Court
denied that it was weighing competing interests. Rather, it con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had asked the court to draw irrational
inferences. 104
Even if one were to apply the Liberty Lobby standard, however,
the plaintiffs in Matsushita seemed to meet the standard. Sufficient
evidence existed in the record from which a jury could reasonably
conclude that the Japanese defendants had acted in concert in order
to monopolize the market in the United States. Matsushita, which
was decided before Liberty Lobby, appears to go further than Liberty
Lobby by permitting courts faced with summary judgment motions
to conclude that a theory is implausible based on assumptions that
have no basis in the evidence presented by either party. 10"
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,'" decided recently,
casts doubt on such a broad interpretation of Matsushita. In Eastman
Kodak, the Court held by a six-to-three majority that there were
genuine issues of material fact for the jury to decide whether the
defendant had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 1 °7 The
majority opinion stressed that Matsushita did not "introduce a special
burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases."'"
' 02 Id. at 589.
m' See supra note 77.
1°' 475 U.S. at 597.
115 In a monograph prepared before Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112
S. Ct. 2072 (1992), was decided, the Federal judicial Center disagreed with this conclusion,
interpreting Matsushita to be a decision based on substantive antitrust law and not one
permitting the courts to usurp the jury's function of selecting between competing inferences.
See Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 491. The Supreme Court openly criticized Judge
Schwarzer's theory that Matsushita placed a special burden on plaintiffs in antitrust suits
facing summary judgment motions. Eastman Kedah, 112 S. Ct. at 2083. But the Court agreed
that Matsushita did not permit the court to select between reasonable competing inferences.
Id. at 2088. Although this characterization of Matsushita may be somewhat disingenuous on
the part of the Supreme Court, it signals a slight shift to the left, a shift that supports this
author's theory that the lower courts may have gone too far in deciding summary judgment
cases in the defendants' favor in the discrimination law area. Other cases decided during this
term confirm this slight shift. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2796-
97 (1992); United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
1116 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
107 Id. at 2089, 2091-92. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
1°B
	 S. Ct.. at 2083.
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Appearing to limit Matsushita to its facts, the Court in Kodak inter-
preted Matsushita to add nothing new to summary judgment juris-
prudence. It limited Matsushita's holding to require only that "the
nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach the
jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated
in that decision." 1 °9
 The Court emphasized that defendant Kodak
bore a "substantial burden in showing that it is entitled to summary
judgment. "110
B. Post-Trilogy Summary Judgment: Undermining Employment
Discrimination Law
Since the summary judgment trilogy, the federal courts of ap-
peals have decided hundreds of discrimination cases on appeal from
a grant of summary judgment. In the vast majority of these cases
the courts of appeals have affirmed the district courts' grant of
summary judgment." Many of the opinions decided by different
panels within the same circuit appear to conflict with one another." 2
149 1d.
" 0 Id.
" In an effort to estimate the effect of the trilogy on the use of summary judgment to
dispose of employment discrimination claims, this author conducted a survey of all reported
decisions of federal courts of appeals reviewing grants of summary judgment in AREA and
Title VII cases decided during two six-month time periods, one in 1983 before the Court
decided the trilogy and one in 1992, after the trilogy. The survey included opinions available
only on Lexis or Westlaw. Excluded from the count were cases that granted summary
judgment for the defendant because of a plaintiff's failure to meet the statute of limitations
or to exhaust administrative remedies.
Between January and June 1992, the courts of appeals reviewed 53 ADEA and Title
VII cases in which the lower courts had granted summary judgment. The appeals courts
affirmed 50 of the 53 grants of summary judgment. Of the 53 cases, there were 17 ADEA
cases, 30 Title VII cases and 6 cases alleging both ADEA and Title VII violations. In 15 of
the ADEA cases, 29 of the 'Title VII cases and all of the cases alleging violations of both
statutes, the courts of appeals affirmed. Summary judgment was reversed in only two ADEA
cases and one Title VII case.
Before the trilogy, from January to June 1983, the courts of appeals reviewed only two
ADEA and two Title VII cases on appeal from grants of summary judgment for the defen-
dant. The courts of appeals affirmed all four cases. Thus, whereas in the first half of 1992
the appeals courts affirmed 50 grants of summary judgment in discrimination cases, during
the first half of 1983 the courts affirmed only four grants of summary judgment. Although
it is unclear how much, if any, of this increase is the result of increased litigation alleging
employment discrimination, these results suggest that the trilogy has had a profound effect
on defendants' actions when faced with an employment discrimination suit. The trilogy has
encouraged defendants in employment discrimination claims to file motions for summary
judgment. It has also given trial courts a means to dispose of employment discrimination
claims without trial, dispositions which are usually affirmed by the courts of appeals.
"? Compare Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988) (court




Some panels approach summary judgment cautiously; others do
not. "s Many recent decisions wrongly interpret the trilogy to permit
courts to draw inferences in defendants' favor," 4 to weigh evi-
dence," 5 to decide the credibility of witnesses 16 and to require
plaintiffs to prove their cases at the summary judgment stage."'
Many courts compound these errors by examining plaintiffs' cir-
cumstantial evidence in a piecemeal fashion."s Other panels, fewer
in number, continue to hold that questions of intent, motive and
credibility are better left to the factfinder." 9
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court initially adopted
the McDonnell Douglas approach to make it easier for plaintiffs to
prove a prima facie case,' 2° the courts of appeals now use this
construct to defeat plaintiffs' claims. For example, there is a growing
trend toward placing a much higher burden on the plaintiff to meet
the "qualified" prong of a prima facie case.'" Previously, in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case, most
witnesses over those of plaintiff) with Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205
(3d Cir. 1987) (court concludes issue as to credibility of employer's proffered reason exists
and reverses summary judgment). See also supra note 64.
116 See infra notes 153, 169, 198.
"4 See infra Part II-B-2. See also Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir.
1991).
"6 See infra Part II-B-1.
116 See infra Part 1I-B-3.
117 See Mathew v. Virginia Union Univ., No. 91-2593, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5540 (4th
Cir. Mar, 27, 1992) (requiring the plaintiff to prove the case at the summary judgment stage);
EEOC v. Techalloy Md., Inc., No. 91-1027, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6499, at *10 (4th Cir.
Mar. 31, 1992); see also infra Part II-B-4.
116 See Flynn v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 90-35891, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6382, at
*20 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 1992) (quoting Steck] v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.
I973)); see also supra Part I I- B- I .
"9 See, e.g., Owens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1991)
(inferences drawn properly in non-movant's favor); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,
401 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The point is only that if the inference of improper motive can be drawn,
there must be a trial.") (emphasis in original); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883
F.2d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing district court's conclusion of the plaintiff's failure
to allege pretext).
125 See supra note 45 and accompanying lext.
121 See, e.g., Kizer v. Children's Learning Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff must prove she met employer's expectations in order to establish "qualified" prong
of prima fade case); Owen v. Penton Publishing Inc., No. 91-3744, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
8482 at *15 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1992) (plaintiff without proof of satisfaction of employer's
legitimate expectations did not make out a prima facie case); Richmond v. Board of Regents
Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992) (in order to make out qualified prong of
prima facie case employee must disprove defense that she was not performing adequately);
Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff "must
disprove Westinghouse's primary reason for choosing him for the RIF—lack of versatility").
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courts merely looked at the objective qualifications of employees:
their education and qualifying experience. Under this objective
qualifications interpretation, a person who has held a job with an
employer for a number of years would almost always meet the
"qualified" requirement. 122
 Even today, most courts will not consider
the employer's testimony that a person is "unqualified" for subjec-
tive reasons such as an employee's lack of leadership potential or
inability to get along with people.' 23 According to the majority view,
a court should consider these factors at the stage when the plaintiff
rebuts the employer's articulation of its legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for the adverse employment decision.' 24
Recently, however, some courts have imposed a higher burden
on plaintiffs trying to make out a prima facie case.' 25 These deci-
122 See, e.g., Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1991)
(even though plaintiff, who was hired in 1968, and employer disagreed over the plaintiff's
performance, court relied on the plaintiff's testimony to prove that he met the employer's
legitimate expectations); Owens, 934 F.2d at 409 ("Owens only needs to demonstrate that she
'possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.'"); Weihaupt v. American
Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 427-29 (7th Cir. 1989) (testimony by plaintiff hired in 1965
that he met employer's expectations was sufficient).
125 See, e.g., Fowle v. C&C Cola, 868 F.2d 58, 59, 66 (3d Cir. 1989); Chipollini v. Spencer
Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 901 (3d Cir. 1987) (because proffered reason, "lack of cooperation,"
is subjective and turns on issue of credibility, plaintiff is entitled to jury trial); Warren v.
Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 758 (4th Cir. 1986) (the term "lack of cooperation" was
"hopelessly elastic and subjective and only served a pretextual—rather than a legitimate—
company function").
"4 Fowle, 868 F.2d at 65. This interpretation is in keeping with the purpose of allocating
proof under the McDonnell DouglasIBurdine standard.
I" See Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 848 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1112 (1st Cir. 1979)) ("To establish that he was qualified a
complainant must show that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibility that
he was fired for inadequate job performance, absolute or relative."); Johnson v. Burnley, 887
F.2d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's tardiness proved as a matter of law she was not
qualified for the position and could not establish a prima facie case).
The Fourth Circuit conceptually collapsed the pretext proof into the prima facie case.
This construct requires much more of a plaintiff faced with a summary judgment motion
than of a plaintiff at trial. At the summary judgment stage, the court will have before it
evidence in support of the defense because it is the defendant's burden to bring the motion
and the defendant will have filed its motion papers detailing its defense before the plaintiff
proves its prima lade case. Thus, the court will require the plaintiff to rebut the defendant's
defense in order to defend against the summary judgment motion. At trial, however, the
court will presumably have no evidence before it of the defendant's defense when ruling on
whether the plaintiff has made out a prima fade case. At most, the court will have the cross-
examination testimony of the plaintiff, admitting to some discrepancies in his or her perfor-
mance. Therefore, the trial judge will likely adhere to the majority view, looking merely to
objective qualifications to determine whether the plaintiff has made out his or her prima
facie case.
Moreover, once at trial, the judge has less incentive to grant a defendant's motion because




sions force plaintiffs to rebut the defense in order to prove that
they are "qualified." This trend is particularly damaging to•a plain-
tiff who is defending against a summary judgment motion because
it shifts the burden from the movant to the plaintiff to disprove the
defense without the benefit of cross-examination.' 26
There is a further perversion of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
formula in the summary judgment context. Courts believe defen-
dants when they articulate their non-discriminatory reasons for the
employment decision and disbelieve plaintiffs when they attempt to
prove that defendants' articulated reasons are pretextual.' 27
 This
tendency occurs for two reasons. First, the defendant has no burden
to prove that the articulated reason is the actual reason for discrim-
ination; the burden is merely to produce a non-discriminatory rea-
son for the actions. Thus, once the defendant has "articulated" a
reason for the decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut
the articulated reason. 128
Second, many courts are extremely hesitant to interfere with
the business decisions of the employer. 129 For example, the court
will not allow the plaintiff to present evidence to the factfinder that
an employer's articulated, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment decision is not an adequate reason for the deci-
sion.'" But the courts misunderstand the argument. The plaintiff
judgment would. Most judges will hear all the evidence before making the decision to dismiss
the plaintiff's case rather than risk the chance of an appeal and reversal, It is therefore likely
that at trial the plaintiff will have the opportunity to have his or her evidence heard by a
factfinder on a lesser showing of a prima facie case. This discrepancy turns McDonnell Douglas
on its ear. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
116 See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Lanctot, supra note 55.
ism
	 courts do not require the employer to present any documentary evidence beyond
the employer's statement of its reason for its employment decision, Nor do the courts require
defendants to state specific reasons for their decision. See, e.g., Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 937 F.2d 1216, 1220 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing defendant's burden as "not difficult
to satisfy," the court concluded defendant met its burden by stating plaintiff lacked versa-
tility); Menard, 848 F.2d at 285 ("Once plaintiff has carried out his burden of proving a prima
facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to arliculaie, not prove, a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action.") (emphasis in original). See generally Baumann et al., supra note 46. See
also infra Part Ill.
I " Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). See also
Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 1 7.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir, 1991) (in a failure to award
tenure case, the court stated, "It is not the function of the courts to sit as 'super-tenure
committees.'") (citations omitted); A angst, 937 F.2d at 1220 ("We must give the employer the
benefit of the doubt regarding its explanation of employment decisions."); Rossy v. Roche
Prods. Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Our role is not to second-guess the business
decisions of an employer. .. .").
10 See Gadson v. Concord Hosp., No. 91-2047, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13010, at *7-8
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does not argue that the employer should not be permitted to dis-
charge employees because the reason for their discharge is inade-
quate, but rather, that the employer's reason makes no sense. If the
employer's alleged reason is nonsensical, the court should allow a
factfinder to infer that the story told by the employer is not credi-
ble."'
It is illogical to prevent an employee from proving pretext by
questioning the adequacy of the employer's reason for discharging
or refusing to hire or promote the plaintiff. For example, if MBI
claimed that it had failed to hire Connie Computer because she had
an ugly green raincoat, that reason would be a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for refusing to hire her, because it is not
illegal to base one's hiring decisions on the color of the applicant's
raincoat. In evaluating Connie's response to a summary judgment
motion made by MB1, the court should permit Connie the reason-
able inference that because the reason articulated by MBI is not
one that a rational employer would use as a criterion for making
business decisions, the employer's articulated reason is not the real
reason but a pretext for discrimination. 132 The court's automatic
crediting of the defendant's articulation is proper when the plaintiff
has the burden of persuasion on the motion, but when the defen-
dant brings the motion, it skews the result in favor of the defendant.
Nevertheless, courts are drawing inferences in favor of the moving
party even though the movant supposedly has a burden to show
the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff's position." 3 This
practice prejudices plaintiffs opposing summary judgment motions
and transposes the proper application of summary judgment. 134
(1st Cir. June 9, 1992) ("Gadson cannot meet burden of proving pretext by simply questioning
[defendanti's articulated reasons.").
" 1 See supra notes 77, 78 and accompanying text; Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830
F.2d 1554, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1987) (question of fact whether defendant's alleged reason
for discharge is plausible where defendant claimed plaintiff had not abided by company rule
requiring plaintiff to call the company to explain she would be absent from work when
plaintiff had already notified the proper person that she was ill during a telephone conver-
sation initiated by the employer).
1 " See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (permitting plaintiff
to prevail once he or she has shown that the employer's reason for adverse employment
decision is not credible).
'" See supra Part I-B-2 and infra Part III-A for discussions concerning the defendant's
burden as movant.
"4 As a practical matter, however, a plaintiff who has had the opportunity to discover
the defendant's evidence will almost invariably have some evidence to rebut the defendant's
articulated reason for the employment decision. A plaintiff therefore should be able to
produce some evidence in response to the defendant's summary judgment motion that would
March 1993]	 SUMMARY JUDGMENT	 233
Although some may argue that this approach is proper because
the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for its decision, and
the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout, it is in-
appropriate at the summary judgment stage because it sanctions
the drawing of inferences against the non-movant and permits the
court to find facts. This approach deprives plaintiffs of their right
to present their cases to the factfinder. if competing reasonable
inferences can arise from the evidence, the case should go to trial.
1. A Piecemeal Approach to Circumstantial Evidence
In most discrimination cases plaintiffs attempt to prove subtle
issues of intent and motive by circumstantial evidence.'" The fact-
finder considers the totality of the evidence to determine whether
it is more likely than not that the defendant had a discriminatory
motive.'" In affirming a lower court's grant of summary judgment
to the defendant, however, the courts of appeals often examine and
describe the evidence in a piecemeal fashion.'" This piecemeal
examination of the evidence undercuts the plaintiff's case.' 38
Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'" is a good example of the
courts' piecemeal approach to circumstantial evidence, assessment
of witness credibility and the drawing of inferences in the defen-
dant's favor. In Mechnig, an ADEA case, the plaintiff, an older
employee, had worked at Sears as an "outside" salesperson.m The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the
plaintiff was unable to rebut the defendant's articulated legitimate,
create a genuine issue of material fact whether the employer's stated reason is the real reason
for the defendant's action. The problem is that courts at the summary judgment stage tend
to believe a defendant's articulation and disbelieve the plaintiff's evidence. See infra Part II-
B-3. Given that plaintiff is the non-movant, it is not the court's role to weigh credibility at
the summary judgment stage. See Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 487.
133 See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of evidence
available to plaintiff's in discrimination cases.
136 See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.44 (1988) ("[t]he trial
court must weigh all evidence and determine whether plaintiff has carried the burden of
convincing the court that illegal considerations motivated" defendant). See also United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.4 (1982) ("The trier of fact
should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.")
(emphasis added).
17 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
158 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
' 33 864 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1988).
"° Id. at 1360.
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non-discriminatory reason for firing him: that plaintiff had falsified
his time records."'
The plaintiff presented two kinds of evidence to show that the
defendant's alleged reason for firing him was pretextual. First, he
offered evidence illustrating how Sears had instructed outside sales-
persons to complete timesheets. 142 Second, he offered evidence
tending to show that the defendant had discriminated against other
older employees. 145
While admitting that on the occasion in question he had arrived
at work a half hour later than his time card stated, the plaintiff
testified that Sears' representatives had told him and other "outside"
salespeople automatically to record forty hours on their weekly
timesheets. 14 The plaintiff's immediate supervisor corroborated his
testimony, adding that outside salespeople generally worked more
than forty hours weekly and that Sears did not want to pay over-
time. 145 The supervisor would have approved the timesheet in ques-
tion because Mechnig was not habitually late."° Another division
manager testified that there was an unwritten rule that outside sales
personnel did not record more than forty hours. 147
Mechnig's statistical evidence analyzed all the sales employees
of Sears stores in the area who had left their positions in 1981 and
1982. The statistical expert testified that persons over forty years
old made up a higher proportion of those terminated.'" Affidavits
of former sales personnel and their supervisors at the Irving Park
store where Mechnig worked averred that full-time employees at
the store who were over forty years of age were more intensely
supervised than younger employees and that Sears had reduced the
number of department managers at the store, a group consisting
primarily of persons over the age of forty. 149 In spite of the strong
evidence in the plaintiff's favor, the court of appeals concluded that
the plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence for a jury to con-
clude that the defendant's articulated reason for firing him—the
falsified timesheet—was a pretext for age discrimination.' 50
1 " Id. at 1366.
142 1d. at 1361.
145 Id. at 1362-63.
141




148 Id. at 1362.
149 Mechnig, 864 F.2d at 1367.
'"Id.
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The court analyzed the plaintiff's evidence in classic piecemeal
fashion. 15 ' It discounted the plaintiff's expert testimony because the
expert had included in his statistical analysis as "terminated" those
older persons who had "voluntarily" accepted Sears' early retire-
ment package. 152 In support of his inclusion of these persons, the
plaintiff argued that the early retirement program was really a
severance program and offered evidence of the limited nature of
benefits provided to older employees taking early retirement.'" The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that the amount of
the benefits did not indicate Sears had violated the ADEA.'"
The court, however, acted inappropriately. The plaintiff had
argued that the early retirement program was not voluntary and
that the limited benefits were relevant to the question of whether
employees took early retirement voluntarily. The court, instead of
permitting the jury to draw its own conclusions, concluded that the
defendant's program was a bona fide voluntary early retirement
program.' 55 The court thus impermissibly drew an inference in the
defendant's favor.' 56
In addition, the court discounted the testimony plaintiff of-
fered of the accepted method of filling out timesheets.' 57 Even
though the defendant's employees testified that Mechnig completed
his timesheets according to instruction, the court concluded that
this testimony did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he falsified his timesheets. The court stated that the plain-
tiff needed to demonstrate that the defendant was aware that others
151 By discussing each piece of evidence separately and pointing out the weakness of
each piece, the courts distort the plaintiff's case. Normally the factfinder infers discriminatory
intent on the part of the defendant by examining the totality of the evidence. Sec supra note
63 discussing the types of evidence a plaintiff can use to prove his or her case.
For cases where courts have analyzed the plaintiff's evidence in a piecemeal fashion,
thereby prejudicing the plaintiff's case, see Flynn v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 90-35891,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6382 (9th Cir. Mar, 23, 1992); Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930
F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1991); Hanchey v. Energas Co„ 925 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1990); Russell v.
Teledyne Ohio Steel, No. 89-3254, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 344 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1990); Rose
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); Wiggins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co„ 876 F.2(1 105 (6th Cir. 1989); Fowle v. C&C Cola, 868 F.2d 58, 65-68 (3d Cir. 1989);
Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 848 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1988).
For examples of courts viewing evidence as a whole, see Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d
398 (7th Cir. 1990); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1990).
152 Merhnig, 864 F.2d at 1367.
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had filled out their timesheets in the same way as plaintiff but had
fired only the plaintiff.' 58
 According to Federal Rule of Evidence
801, however, the defendant's agents' -testimony should have been
treated as admissions that the practice existed at Sears.' 59 Know-
ledge that this practice existed without firing the employees who
engaged in it should have been imputed to the defendant.
By requiring the plaintiff to prove at the summary judgment
stage that Sears knew that there were others filling out forty-hour
timesheets, the court created a major obstacle for the plaintiff.
Seemingly nothing short of a Sears memorandum admitting to the
practice would satisfy the court. Such evidence is nearly impossible
for a plaintiff to produce. Instead of recognizing that there was a
genuine issue of material fact concerning the reason why the de-
fendant fired the plaintiff, the court believed the defendant's wit-
nesses and documents and ignored the plaintiff's evidence of pre-
text. The court's language is instructive in understanding its bias in
favor of the defendant's proof of motivation. It stated that Sears
had "clear good faith reliance upon its time card policy," even
though good faith is obviously a question of fact that the court could
not resolve in this case without live witness testimony.
2. Drawing Inferences in the Defendant's Favor
In McCoy v. W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Co., the plaintiff,
transferred and discharged at age forty-six, alleged that the defen-
dant had violated the ADEA.' 6° The defendant alleged that McCoy
was fired for poor performance and for budgetary reasons. The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the
court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there were no genuine
issues of material fact regarding pretext.' 6 '
To prove that there was a genuine issue of material fact, McCoy
presented evidence that he had received good performance reviews
throughout his five years with the company and that the defendant
18 Mechnig, 864 F.2d at 1367.
19 See FED. R. Eva). 80I(d)(2)(C) and (D), providing that a statement is not hearsay if it
is offered against a party and is:
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning
the subject or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment made during the existence of the
relationship.. ..
The Court will treat such a statement as an admission of a party opponent.
16° 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992).
161 Id. at 374.
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had failed to raise poor performance as a defense for the firing
during an administrative hearing on the same issue.' 62 Moreover,
McCoy rebutted the claim that he was fired for budgetary reasons
by demonstrating that when he was transferred and fired, the com-
pany replaced him in both positions with younger persons who
made substantially more money.'" Despite this very strong evidence
in the plaintiff's favor, however, the court drew the inferences in
favor of the defendant, citing to a single piece of evidence: a per-
formance review in which the plaintiff's supervisor stated that he
and McCoy were not on the same "wave length."' 64 The court
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether
the defendant's articulated reasons for the transfer and firing were
its true reasons.'"
3. Assessing Credibility
Courts of appeals have affirmed grants of summary judgment
where the lower courts have made credibility determinations that
152 Id. at 373.
163 Id
'mid at 370.
165 Id. at 374. Other cases where the courts of appeals have drawn inferences against the
plaintiffs, the non-movants, when considering a summary judgment motion include: 1.1anchey
v. Energas Co., 925 F.2c1 96, 98-99 (9th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff did not prove that defendant's
articulated reason for firing her—that it was having an economic downturn—was pretextual
even though the company, only months after eliminating her position bought another gas
company for $61 million); Fowle v. C&C Cola, 868 F.2d 58, 59, 66 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
did not rebut the defendant's assertion that it did not promote him to vice president because
the job required the person filling the position to be a "backup" to the president, and
defendant did not believe plaintiff had qualifications to take over the company, even though
the person who eventually filled the position admittedly was not qualified to back up the
president); Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir. 1988) (court
stated that defendant's proffered reason for firing plaintiff—that he was a poor record-
keeper—was something it "may presume became more intolerable" and concluded that the
plaintiff failed to show pretext even though he presented uncontested evidence that he had
received many awards and had been chosen to head defendant's credit office in Puerto Rico).
Some cases that have properly drawn all inferences in favor of the non-moving party
include: Owens v. New York City lions. Audi., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991) (court
reversed summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff established prima facie case that
requires only minimum proof to show she was qualified, and finding a genuine issue of fact
existed as to pretext because plaintiff's supervisor, who brought a "vast majority" of disci-
plinary charges against her, made comments regarding plaintiff's age and admitted having
a poor relationship with her); Burns v. Gadsden State Community \ College, 908 F.2d 1512,
1518 (11th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff's affidavits in which defendant stated that it would never
name a woman to a "schedule B" job for which plaintiff applied and was rejected created a
genuine issue of material fact); EEOC v. Mount Lebanon, Pa., 842 F.2d 1480, 1487 (3d Cir.
1988) (jury question whether the official responsible for implementing disability plan in 1982
was aware of the termination of insurance benefits).
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the factfinder should make. In Merrick v. Farmers Insurance Group,' 66
an age discrimination case, the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant.' 67
 Plaintiff
D. James Merrick began working for the defendant in 1970. Mer-
rick was promoted throughout the years, but in 1981, when he was
forty-nine, the company passed him over for a promotion to Divi-
sion Area Manager, giving the job to twenty-five-year-old Craig
Schienost.' 68
The defendant conceded that Merrick made a prima facie case,
but averred that Merrick was not promoted to the position of Di-
vision Area Manager because he did not command the respect
needed or have the necessary positive demeanor for the position. 169
Farmers also claimed that the two employees responsible for selec-
tion of Division Area Managers recommended Schienost for the
job.' 70
Merrick submitted substantial evidence to prove that the de-
fendant's alleged reasons for hiring Schienost instead of Merrick
were pretextual. First, Merrick had greater experience than Schien-
ost, had performed his job better than Schienost and was recom-
mended highly by his supervisor."' Second, Merrick also argued
that Farmers' alleged reasons for not promoting him were not
credible because they were not documented until after Merrick
commenced the lawsuit.'" Finally, Merrick argued that the recom-
mendations of Schienost were questionable because Schienost had
never interviewed for the position.'"
Despite Merrick's superior credentials and the defendant's
after-the-fact explanations for not promoting him, the court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that Merrick had failed to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's articu-
lated reasons for refusing to promote the plaintiff were pretex-
tual.'" The court of appeals stated that the plaintiff should have
specifically rebutted the defendant's general assertion that the plain-
tiff lacked professionalism and the proper demeanor for the posi-
' 66 892 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1990).
' 67 1d. at 1436.
168 Id.
169 1d. at 1437.
1 "Id.
171
 Merrick 892 F.2d at 1438.
'" Id.
'" Id. at 1437.
Iuld. at 1438.
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tion.' 75 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling despite
significant and substantial evidence supporting the plaintiff's posi-
tion. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals accepted the
lower court's improper inferences and determination of witness
credibility.
Similarly, in Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co., ' 76 the plaintiff,
a fifty-six-year-old man employed by the defendant for twenty-five
years, alleged that his employer had discharged him in violation of
the ADEA. Healy, the marketing vice president, had regularly re-
ceived promotions and excellent performance reviews until 1986,
when he was notified that he was being discharged as part of a staff
reduction.'" The bulk of Healy's responsibilities were reassigned
to Paul Russell, Healy's forty-seven-year-old subordinate.' 78 Com-
pany representatives testified that they intended to combine the vice
presidents in charge of agent training and management training
into one position'''s and that the plaintiff could not effectively han-
dle the' increased responsibility a combined division of agent and
management training would require.' 8°
r75
	
Other courts have also defeated the plaintiff's claims at the summary judgment
stage by requiring the plaintiff to prove pretext by rebutting the defendant's articulated
reason for the adverse employment decision with great specificity. See, e.g., Menzel v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 330 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary judgment in defendant's favor
affirmed because plaintiff had not specifically proven false defendant's articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for firing hitn even though plaintiff had produced a plethora of
evidence that he had worked for defendant for eight years, had received awards and pro-
motions and his overall job performance ratings were very good). For other cases that require
the plaintiff to specifically prove pretext, see infra note 239. This approach undermines the
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas formula. By requiring such specificity the courts actually
draw an inference in favor of the defendant that the articulated reason for firing the plaintiff
is the "real" reason. This determination is a jury question.
Two cases that properly refused to require specificity when there was ample evidence
of overall good performance are Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) and
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1987).
06 1160 F.2(1 1209 (3d Cir. 1988),
177 Id. at 1210-12. Healy was also experienced in agent training. Id.
178 14.
"9 Id.
1 "0 Healy, 860'11.2d 1210-12. Granting summary judgment to a defendant where that
defendant. states that it used subjective criteria such as a person's potential to take on more
responsibility, leadership potential or ability to get along with people is especially problematic.
Although most employment decisions for personnel operating at the highest level of the
corporation may be made by use of subjective criteria such as these, subjective criteria can
mask discrimination based on illegal criteria. When an employer's reason for the adverse
employment decision is allegedly based on subjective, rather than objective qualifications, the
factlinder must therefore have the opportunity to scrutinize the defendant's credibility care-
fully. This scrutiny can take place only at trial where the witnesses are subject to cross-
examination. See Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although
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This position merger ultimately took place, with Russell in
charge, but it did not take place immediately.' 8 ' The job was not
combined until four months after Healy's discharge, and when
Russell took over, he initially received weak performance reviews. 182
This evidence calls into question the defendant's assertions that it
believed that Russell was clearly better prepared to handle the job
than the more experienced Healy.' 83
In support of its position, New York Life averred that Healy
had performed poorly on the Management by Objectives Report.
New York Life pointed to isolated statements in prior performance
reviews and to Healy's last review. Apparently, Healy's supervisor
completed the last review in preparation for litigation because he
filled it out six months after Healy's discharge, just one month after
Healy filed a complaint of age discrimination against the company
with the EEOC.' 84
Healy disputed the company's position on the Management by
Objectives Report. The defendant averred that Healy had per-
formed poorly in preparing the report because he had merely
collected information from others and collated it instead of exer-
cising initiative and insight. Healy testified that he believed his
function in the project was to assemble the raw data, incorporate it
into the report and send it on to his supervisors. 185 The trial court,
ruling against Healy, credited the defendant's witnesses instead of
reserving that function for the jury.' 86
relying on subjective factors is not per se illegal, the jury may under some circumstances,
reasonably consider subjective reasons as pretexts for discrimination."). Such scrutiny is
especially necessary where the defendant's reasons for termination were never articulated
before the employment decision and thus appear to be after-the-fact justifications, as is the
case in Healy. See Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 757 n.I2 (4th Cir. 1986) (lower
court's finding of fact that plaintiff was not discriminated against in his discharge was clearly
erroneous where reason for discharge was "lack of cooperation" and employer could not
explain clearly what it meant by this term).
iSi 860 F.2d at 1212.
182 Id. at 1224 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
I " Healy demonstrates my point that, although I agree with Catherine Lanctot that the
pretext-plus jurisdictions wrongly apply the substantive Title VII and AREA law, the im-
proper application of pretext-plus is not the entire problem with the courts' interpretation
of discrimination law. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. This application does not
account for the courts' affirmation of improper grants of summary judgment where issues
of credibility exist or where the lower courts weigh the evidence. In the Third Circuit, where
Healy was decided, the law was clear that it was not a pretext-plus jurisdiction. See Chippolini
v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 900 (3d Cir. 1987).
164 Under the ADEA, a plaintiff seeking to file suit must first file a complaint with the
EEOC. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
186 Healy, 860 F.2d at 1217.
"6 See id.; id. at 1220 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
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In affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals
held that Healy had made out a prima facie case' 87 but had not
raised a genuine issue of material fact. 188 Healy therefore went
beyond the trilogy. Even if Anderson v. Liberty Lobby countenances
weighing the evidence to determine whether a jury could reasonably
find for the non-movant before refusing to grant summary judg-
ment to a defendant, the opinion cannot be interpreted in its broad-
est swath to require, or even to permit, courts to judge the credibility
of witnesses who are before them on paper only.'"
4. Requiring the Plaintiff to Prove the Case at the Summary
Judgment Phase
When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the proper
inquiry is whether the defendant has demonstrated that there are
insufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably conclude that
the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Many courts
approaching a summary judgment motion in a civil rights case,
however, require a plaintiff to prove that she was discriminated
against."'
There are two problems with the courts' approach. First, the
courts, citing to Celotex, have shifted the burden of proof on a
motion for summary judgment from the moving party to the plain-
tiff. 192 Second, the courts require the plaintiff to meet the ultimate
187 860 F.2d at 1214 n.1.
' 8' Id. at 1220 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
189 See Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Ed, of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 514 (6th Cir. 1991) (summary
judgment reversed because district court made credibility determination and drew inferences
in defendant's favor); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1423 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(on review, court properly inferred employer discharged plaintiff in retaliation, because
plaintiff declined to accept early retirement and had consistently received good to outstanding
reviews since 1942); Johnson v. Minnesota Hist. Soc'y, 931 F.2c1 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991)
(suinniary judgment reversed because lower court resolved conflicting evidence as to whether
plaintiff's job continued to exist); Taggart v. Time Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (court
properly inferred that defendant's reason not to hire plaintiff, overqualification, raised
inference of age discrimination). But see Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d
332, 336 (7th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Williams Elecs., Inc., 856 F.2d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 1988);
Cotton v, City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
1" See Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1990).
191 See, e.g., Mathew v. Virginia Union Univ., No. 91-2593, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5540
at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 27, 1992) ("In order to prevail . . . [plaintiff] must prove that 'but for'
defendant's discriminatory intent, no, adverse employment decisions would have been taken
against h i m,").
192 See, e.g., Holmberg v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1387, 1392 n.4 (7th Cir.
1990) (court concluded that to prevail at summary judgment plaintiff should have produced
evidence that she was qualified for alternative positions, but defendant is not required to
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burden of proof at the summary judgment stage)" For example,
courts granting summary judgment to a defendant generally use
language appropriate for proof at trial, such as "plaintiff has not
proved that defendant's reason for firing her is pretextual." 94
This is an inappropriate inquiry at the summary judgment
stage. Instead, the court should examine whether there is a question
of fact as to the defendant's articulated reason for firing the plain-
tiff.'" This confusion, likely generated by Liberty Lobby and Celotex,
when combined with the courts' misuse of the McDonnell Douglas
construct,' 96 puts plaintiffs at a distinct disadvantage when faced
with a summary judgment motion. There is no indication in Liberty
Lobby or Celotex that the Supreme Court intended plaintiffs in em-
ployment discrimination cases to suffer to this extent. Furthermore,
although the Court has recently exhibited hostility to civil rights
claims) 97 it has not withdrawn its support of the use of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas construct.'"
negate plaintiff's claim if she failed to set forth sufficient evidence for an element of her
prima facie case).
195 See, e.g., Kizer v. Children's Learning Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1992) ("we
hold that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case ... because she is unable to
demonstrate that despite her violation of [defendant]'s call-in procedure, she was doing her
job well enough to meet her employer's legitimate expectations and nonetheless, she was
discharged"); Karazanos, 948 F.2d at 336-37 (although plaintiff offered facts that another
employee in the protected age group who worked on the same project was discharged,
plaintiff presented no reasons for the employee's discharge, and although plaintiff presented
statistical evidence of age discrimination, he did not provide a "causal link" between the
graph and his termination); Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 330 (1st Cir.
1988) (in responding to summary judgment motion, "Menzel had to address [the reasons
offered by the employer] and show, by a preponderance of the evidence that they were most
probably not the actual reasons.").
' 44 See Menzel, 848 F,2d at 327.
I" Some courts use the appropriate inquiry. See, e.g., Rossy v. Roche Prods., 880 F.2d
621, 626 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Ail of Roche's explanations may in fact be accurate, but they must
be decided after trial, especially in cases such as this where Roche's intent is the central
issue."); Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, 837 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988) ("While Russo's
case is hardly a powerful one, we believe that a trier of fact might find that Trifari's avowed
reasons . . . were pretextual."); Jackson v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir.
1987) ("At the summary judgment stage ... all that is required [for the non-moving party
to survive the motion] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth [at
trial].").
196 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes I, 3, 4 and accompanying text.
' 9" United States Postal Serv. Rd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)
(although the Court ruled that McDonnell Douglas need not be slavishly followed, nowhere in




III. HARMONIZING THE "NEW" SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH
SUBSTANTIVE LAW: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Before the Supreme Court handed down the summary judg-
ment trilogy, lower courts were hesitant to grant summary judgment
to defendants in federal discrimination suits because they believed
that the factfinder should decide questions of intent and motivation
with the benefit of live witness testimony.' 99 Even then, however,
courts granted summary judgment to the defendant if the plaintiff
presented only a "bare bones" prima facie case.20° Courts uniformly
required plaintiffs to present some evidence of pretext in order to
withstand a summary judgment motion. 2°'
The Supreme Court has never addressed the trilogy's effect on
motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination
claims. Since the Court decided the trilogy, however, lower courts
have expanded their use of summary judgment to dispose of these
discrimination claims beyond the limited number of cases where
the plaintiff presented merely a bare bones prima facie case. 202
Federal courts of appeals have affirmed judgments granted sum-
marily even in cases where the lower courts made credibility deter-
minations, drew inferences in the defendant's favor and weighed
the evidence.213 As this Article demonstrates, these decisions are
misguided.
I " See supra note 14.
2mA "bare hones" prima facie case for purposes of this Article is the minimum amount
of proof required to prove a prima facie case. Many plaintiffs, however, offer much more
as part of their prima facie case than the bare hones. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the minimum prima facie case.
WI See Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff cannot rely on her
prima facie case and intent to cross-examine at trial to withstand summary judgment). See
also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff cannot defeat summary
judgment motion simply by making out a prima facie case if the defendant articulates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision). Where, however,
the plaintiff produces more than a bare bones prima facie case, the plaintiff should be able
to rebut the defendant's articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
employment decision. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d
1104, !ill (9th Cir. 1991) ("Specifically, in evaluating whether the defendant's articulated
reason is pretextual, the trier of fact must, at a minimum, consider the same evidence that
the plaintiff introduced to establish her prima facie case. When that evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption, a factual question
will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. The existence
of this question of material fact will ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment.")
(citations omitted).
214 See supra Part 11-B.
2° ' See supra Part 11-B.
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A workable standard can exist, however, to guide courts decid-
ing whether to grant summary judgment motions in federal em-
ployment discrimination cases. The standard proposed here accom-
modates the interest of judicial economy heralded by the trilogy's
supporters while respecting the rights of civil rights plaintiffs. By
keeping in mind the import of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine for-
mula and how it interrelates with the trilogy, courts can consistently
and fairly decide summary judgment motions brought by defen-
dants in discrimination cases. Courts must avoid making determi-
nations of credibility and intent at the summary judgment stage
precisely because the factfinder can make these determinations
fairly and accurately only after hearing the witnesses testify in court.
A. The Defendant's Heightened Burden
To implement this standard, the courts must first acknowledge
that the confluence of Liberty Lobby and McDonnell Douglas requires
courts to treat civil rights claims differently from other civil cases.
Liberty Lobby holds that the courts must consider the substantive law
in determining when to grant summary judgment. 2°4 The McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine formula is the substantive anti-discrimination law. 205
While Celotex seems to lower the threshold proof required of a
defendant moving for summary judgment in the ordinary case, 206
a defendant moving for summary judgment of a civil rights claim
has a higher burden because of the McDonnell Douglas formula.
A defendant seeking summary judgment in a disparate treat-
ment case has a higher burden because two burdens actually exist.
The defendant must first demonstrate the absence of evidence in
the record supporting the plaintiff's case, 207 a burden that a defen-
dant bringing a summary judgment motion carries in an ordinary
civil suit. A discrimination defendant must then also satisfy the
second burden, imposed by McDonnell Douglas, of articulating a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its business decision once
plaintiff has shown that a prima facie case of discrimination exists.
As a practical matter, a discrimination defendant moving for
summary judgment will not wait for the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case in response to the motion. Rather, in the moving papers,
the defendant will attempt to articulate a legitimate, non-discrimi-
2" 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986).
2" See supra Part I-13.
2°6 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
407 See supra Part II-A-2.
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natory reason for the employment decision. Thus the two burdens
merge, heightening the burden on an employer seeking summary
judgment.'" Placing a higher burden on the employer is consistent
with McDonnell Douglas's goal of eliminating discrimination in the
workplace, because the higher burden assists the plaintiff to obtain
a factual hearing on the question of defendant's intent. 209
B. A Sliding-Scale Approach
The defendant's heightened burden does not mean, of course,
that a court should never grant summary judgment to a defendant
charged with discrimination. Rather, the courts should use a sliding
scale. The defendant in a discrimination suit has a higher burden
when moving for summary judgment. Accordingly, the quantum
and quality of proof the defendant presents in its motion for sum-
mary judgment should be determinative of the quantum and quality
of proof a discrimination plaintiff will be required to present in
order to respond successfully to the motion. This sliding-scale ap-
proach encourages the courts to avoid assessing witness credibility
and inference-drawing in the movant's favor. 21" There are four
possible combinations of proof to consider in order to understand
20" Although it may appear that 1 am mixing apples and oranges in that the initial burden
on the defendant is a procedural one and the burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discrim-
inatury reason kw the employment decision is substantive, in this case procedure is substance.
In order for a defendant to prove an absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim,
the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse em-
ployment decision. See generally Baumann et al., supra note 46.
209 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Some may argue that the purpose of
McDonnell DouglasIBurdine was merely to allow a plaintiff alleging discrimination to survive a
motion to dismiss, thereby giving the plaintiff adequate opportunity to discover evidence of
discriminatory intent. Although this argument is not inconsistent with the view that the Court
intended to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their cases, the Court in Burdine seems
to belie this argument. In Burdine, the Court made clear that it believed that the shifting of
the burden of production, rather than the burden of persuasion would adequately protect
plaintiffs in this type of case for three reasons. See 450 U.S. at 258. First, the defendant's
explanation of its legitimate reasons must he clear and specific in order to rebut the prima
facie case and to afford the plaintiff ''a full and fair opportunity" to demonstrate that the
defendant's alleged reason is pretextual. Id. Second, the defendant will have an incentive to
persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful and will attempt to prove
the factual basis for its explanation. Id. Third, the plaintiff will have access to the EEOC
investigatory files that supplement discovery. Id, In its discussion of the second reason for
not shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the Court strongly implied that it
envisioned that these cases would be heard by a factfinder at trial. See id.
210 Only a few panels have discussed this sliding-scale approach to summary judgment
in discrimination claims. See, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934
F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 n.5 (1st Cir.
1990).
246	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:203
the application of a sliding-scale approach to a defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
1. Defendants' Assertions and Plaintiffs' "Bare Bones" Prima
Facie Case
A defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse employment decision by making bare assertions
without any documentary proof. A plaintiff responds by presenting
a "bare bones" prima facie case. 2 " Most courts would grant the
motion for summary judgment. 2 ' 2 Under the sliding-scale approach
proposed here, however, the court would deny the motion because
in order to grant the motion, the court would have to find the
defendant's witnesses credible and draw inferences in favor of the
defendant, the moving party.
2. Defendants' Assertions and Plaintiffs' Prima Facie Case Plus
Some Evidence of Pretext
The defendant offers the same articulation as in Number One
above. The plaintiff responds with a prima facie case plus some
evidence of pretext. 2 " Under current Title VII and ADEA juris-
211 See supra note 204.
212 See Gadson v. Concord Community College, 966 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992); Rush v.
McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1992); Young v. General Foods Corp., 840
F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1988); Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1987).
213 See supra note 64. This concept can be very confusing for the courts. See Holmberg
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Rather than make our
inquiry more difficult through the rigid and mechanistic application of the McDonnell-Douglas
burden shifting analysis, we will analyze the case shifting our focus as appropriate from
[plaintifl]'s prima facie burden to her burden of showing pretext.") (citations omitted). Many
courts characterize evidence that would ordinarily be considered evidence of pretext as
evidence supporting the prima facie case.
Whatever this evidence is called, whether it be in support of a prima facie case or to
demonstrate pretext, the courts should consider it in determining whether the defendant's
motion should be granted. See Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1112 ("[T]he evidence [the
plaintiff] introduced is direct and consists of more than the McDonnell-Douglas presumption.
Accordingly that evidence serves a dual purpose. It is sufficient not only to establish her
prima facie case, but also to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
defendant's articulated reasons are pretextual.") (emphasis added); Johnson v. Minnesota
Hist. Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The factually oriented case by case nature
of discrimination claims requires the court not to be overly rigid in considering evidence of
discrimination offered by plaintiff."); Yartzoff v.Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1987)
(evidence already introduced to establish a prima facie case may be considered, and may
suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation). See also Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1112
(court considered evidence that the plaintiff was one of the oldest faculty members, the only
female, was referred to as "an old warhorse" and whose students were called "little old ladies"
March 1993]	 SUMMARY J UDGMENT 	 247
prudence, there would be inconsistent results. Many courts would
grant the motion, 2 " while others would deny it:215 A court using
the sliding-scale approach would deny the motion for the same
reasons as in Number One—the competing evidentiary positions
permit a reasonable factfinder to find for the plaintiff.
3. Defendants' Documentary Proof and Plaintiffs' "Bare Bones"
Prima Facie Case
The defendant's articulation includes more than bare assertions
(i.e., it includes documentary evidence of poor performance). The
plaintiff responds with a "bare bones" prima facie case. 216 In the
same way as the courts using the current approach, a court em-
ploying the proposed sliding-scale approach would grant summary
judgment. This is the proper result because the defendant has
presented more than mere assertions. The defendant has offered
proof that the plaintiff would have to rebut at trial in order to win,
but the plaintiff has responded with insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find in his or her favor. By granting the motion,
the court does not choose between the credibility of the plaintiff's
and the defendant's witnesses. Rather, because the quantum and
quality of the defendant's proof overwhelms the plaintiff's proof,
the court correctly concludes that no reasonable jury could find that
the defendant's articulated non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.
Even if the plaintiff plans to rely on cross-examination at trial to
establish pretext, there should be some evidence to use to cross-
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434
(9th Cir. 1991) (evidence that supervisor believed both female candidates for the position
were inadequate because they got "nervous" and another female candidate "gets easily upset"
was sexual stereotyping and evidence of sex discrimination under Title VII),
2 " See, e.g., EEOC v. Techalloy Md. Inc., No. 91-1027, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6499, at
*3 (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 1992) (although plaintiff in a sex discrimination case presented evidence
that she was as qualified as the man chosen for the position she sought, the court concluded
that "the mere fact that a man was picked instead of a woman is insufficient to establish a
case of sex discrimination"); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1990)
(although the court conceded plaintiff created a triable issue of fact concerning pretext, it
was unable to find "enough evidence of age discrimination").
2 ' 5 See Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding
defendant's remark that plaintiff was "too old" in addition to prima facie case was sufficient
to establish an issue of fact); Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1990)
("This case is close, but we find that the inconsistencies and implausibilities contained within
[defendant's] explanation for its conduct are of sufficient magnitude to constitute enough
evidence of pretext for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment.").
216 See supra note 204.
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examine the witness. In order to survive the motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff should present that evidence here.
4. Defendants' Documentary Proof and Plaintiffs' Prima Facie
Case Plus Some Evidence of Pretext
The defendant's articulation is the same as Number Three
above. The plaintiff responds with a prima facie case plus some
evidence of pretext. 217 Under the current approach, some courts
would grant the motion, and some would deny the motion. 218 A
court employing the sliding-scale approach would consider the evi-
dence presented by both sides and would most likely deny the
motion in order to avoid making credibility determinations and
drawing improper inferences.
a. Computer v. MBI: An Illustration
To illustrate the sliding-scale approach, we will return to our
hypothetical of Connie Computer and MBI 21 ° and examine the
outcome of summary judgment motions filed by MBI in the four
different combinations of proof described above.
Case One: Assume that after discovery, defendant MBI moves
for summary judgment. In its papers, MBI avers in an affidavit,
without presenting any documentary evidence, that it failed to hire
Ms. Computer because Noel Knownothing was better qualified than
the plaintiff. The affidavit does not describe with specificity why
MBI believed that Mr. Knownothing was better qualified than Con-
nie Computer. If the plaintiff's response does nothing more than
make out a bare bones prima facie case, 22° the case is now in equi-
poise. Most federal courts today would say that the presumption
created by the plaintiff's prima facie case is defeated now that the
defendant has met its burden of production. 22 ' Connie Computer
217 See supra note 64.
218 For an example of summary judgment granted under similar circumstances, see
Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 376-77 (5th Cir, 1991) (requiring the plaintiff to
specifically disprove all of defendant's proffered reasons for his discharge even though
plaintiff presented enough evidence to show there was disagreement between him and his
employer on material issues). Chauhan, 897 F.2d at 123, is a good example of a court's
denying summary judgment where the plaintiff presented some evidence of pretext.
219 See supra Part I.
22° See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
221 See Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1991)
(defendant's articulated non-discriminatory reason "dissolved the presumption created by
the prima fade case"); Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1173 (lst Cir. 1991) (by
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would lose her case under currently accepted Title VII jurispru-
dence.222
This result, however, is improper. The court is placing a higher
burden on a Title VII plaintiff responding to summary judgment
motions than on Title VII plaintiffs at trial. It is not clear that MB1
met its Celotex burden of demonstrating an absence of proof sup-
porting Connie's position. Moreover, there exists a distinct possibil-
ity that the factfinder may choose to disbelieve MBI at trial.
If the case were to go to trial, Connie would present her evi-
dence of a prima facie case, and MBI would articulate its reason
for not hiring her. Suppose MBI's representative merely testifies,
without producing any documentary or other proof, that it hired
Mr. Knownothing over Ms. Computer because Mr. Knownothing
was better qualified. MBI then moves for a directed verdict at the
end of the trial. Here, MBI should lose the motion because it would
be for the factfinder, after hearing Connie's cross-examination of
MBI's representative, to decide whether to believe MBI's asserted
reason for not hiring plaintiff. This is a simple question of credi-
bility. If the factfinder finds MBI's story incredible, it should be
permitted to find for Connie Computer because she has demon-
strated that the defendant's story is a pretext through her cross-
examination. Once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant's true
reason is not the articulated reason for its actions, the plaintiff wins
the case. 223
Despite the virtually ironclad logic favoring plaintiffs in such
circumstances, courts ruling on summary judgment motions under
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge, the defen-
dant "nullified any discriminatory inference raised by the prima facie case"); Mesnick v.
General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824-25 (1st. Cir. 1988) ("It is settled that the presumption
arising from a discrimination plaintiff's prima facie case vanishes once the employer has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing the employee.") (citations
omitted). See also 1 pic( B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
COMMENTARY ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES
§§ 301-59 (1992) ("Upon the submission of some credible evidence by the defendant, the
presumption of discrimination drops from the case.").
222 See Carlson v. Concord Community College, No. 91-2047, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
13010 at *2 (1st Cir. June 9, 1992) (citing Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 128
(1st Cir. 1991)) ("11'llaintiff may not simply refute or question the employer's reasons. To
defeat summary judgment at this stage, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the real reason
for the employer's action was discrimination."); Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245,
1248 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1982)) (in
order to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must "tender a genuine issue of material fact as
to pretext").
2" See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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similar circumstances have uniformly held that the mere chance
that the jury may disbelieve the defendant at trial, absent any evi-
dence of pretext, is not sufficient to allow the case to go to tria1. 224
This approach does not make sense, because the plaintiff has al-
ready made out a prima facie case, 225
 and MBI, for example, has
done nothing more than make unsupported assertions that Mr.
Knownothing is better qualified than Connie Computer—a bare
bones denial. If the court grants summary judgment in such a
circumstance, it is indisputedly and improperly making a credibility
determination in the defendant's favor. This is the situation where
MBI's initial burden upon moving for summary judgment under
Celotex and its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its action should merge to heighten the defendant's
burden.
Under Burdine, the defendant should be required to articulate
a much clearer, more specific reason for its decision. 226 For example,
at the summary judgment stage a mere assertion that Mr. Know-
nothing is better qualified than Connie Computer should not be
sufficient to meet the defendant's burden of articulating a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge, because Connie
Computer has no opportunity to test MBI's witnesses' credibility on
2" See Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff cannot
successfully respond to a summary judgment motion by stating a prima facie case and
expressing an intent to challenge defendant's credibility on cross-examination); Chauhan v.
M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990) (that a factfinder might disbelieve defendant's
asserted, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision is not enough to create a
genuine issue of material fact—plaintiff must submit some evidence from which the jury
could reasonably conclude that defendant's explanation is incredible).
25
 In her dissent in Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988),
Judge Shapiro argues that Celotex and Liberty Lobby do not require the same level of proof
when the non-moving party has already made out a prima facie case and must merely rebut
the defendant's showing. 860 F.2d at 1226-27 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). See also Warren v.
Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 753 (4th Cir. 1986) ("plaintiff's initial evidence should be
combined with the evidence arising from cross-examination in order to determine whether
the defendant's reasons are legally sufficient or whether they should be discredited" at trial).
Warren, which is riddled with instances of conflicting testimony by the defendant's own
witness, demonstrates the importance of cross-examination at trial. For example, defendant's
decision to terminate Alvin Warren was based on documentation of his "lack of cooperation."
Id. at 757. The clearly pretextual nature of such subjective criteria became apparent by the
cross-examination of defendant's personnel manager. Id. at 758 n.13. Unable to articulate a
standard for uncooperative behavior, one personnel manager commented that "it is just a
discretionary concept." Id. The plant manager, however, stated that lack of cooperation meant
that an employee failed to get work done. Id. at 758 n.14. Without the benefit of cross-
examination, plaintiff would not have been able to demonstrate pretext.
"4 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
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cross-examination. 227 If the court were to conclude that MBI's proof
is sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff, the court would
actually be drawing the inference in MBI's favor, a practice that
should not occur at the summary judgment stage when the defen-
dant is the moving party.
Case Two: Let us change our hypothetical slightly. Assume that
Ms. Computer and Mr. Knownothing worked side by side as com-
puter sales representatives for MBI and that an opening arises for
a management position at MBI. Both Connie and Noel apply for
the promotion. Noel gets the promotion. Connie sues MBI for sex
discrimination. MI31 moves for summary judgment, supporting its
motion with the same affidavits it submitted in Case One, claiming
that Mr. Knownothing was better qualified than Connie Computer.
Ms. Computer opposes MB l's motion for summary judgment with
an affidavit setting forth a prima facie case and additionally averring
that she worked with Mr. Knownothing and that he is not better
qualified than she is for the position. Courts have uniformly granted
the defendant's motion under similar circumstances. 228 First, courts
have concluded that the defendant's assertions shift the burden back
to the plaintiff, requiring a demonstration that the defendant's
articulated reason is a pretex029 Second, a plaintiff's testimony that
she is better qualified for the job is an example of "subjective belief"
testimony that is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
of whether the reason given for not hiring the plaintiff is pretex-
tual.2" Courts opine that it is not the plaintiff's subjective belief but
rather, the defendant's subjective intent at the time of the alleged
discriminatory action, that will control whether the plaintiff should
prevail. 23 '
"7 Courts currently require no more than these bare assertions for a defendant to meet
its burden of production. See supra Part I-B-2 for a discussion of the defendant's burden.
"8
 See supra Part III-B.
"9 See supra note 64. At the summary judgment stage, this should mean that a plaintiff
must set forth evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant's
articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. See supra Part III -B.
2" See Allen - v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 985 (10th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's
subjective belief that she was more qualified than the successful applicants insufficient to
raise genuine issue of material fact even though defendants never put into evidence any
proof that the persons selected were better qualified); Billopa v. Methodist Hosp. of Chicago,
922 F.2d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Subjective beliefs of the plaintiff, however, are insuf-
ficient to create a genuine issue of material fact."); Spangle v. Valley Forge Sewer Auth., 839
F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's subjective belief, without proof of his qualification
to perform supervisory duties where such duties were assumed by a considerably younger
person, is not enough to raise an inference of age discrimination).
251 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also Welhaup1, 874 F,2d at 429 ("even
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Although at first blush this holding seems supportable, there
are two problems. First, a defendant may not meet its burden under
Burdine merely by testifying that the person hired is better qualified
than the plaintiff. 232 Thus, the burden should not shift to the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the defendant's reason for the decision is pretextual. Sec-
ond, even assuming that the defendant has met the burden of
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for promoting
another candidate, by crediting the defendant's explanation over
the plaintiff's, the court makes a veiled credibility determination in
the defendant's favor. This simplistic approach assumes that defen-
dants will always tell the truth. If courts could be assured that
defendants would always tell the truth when they articulate their
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring a plaintiff, the
courts' analysis would be supportable. Obviously, however, defen-
dants have an incentive to misrepresent the truth. 235 The only check
on the defendant's misrepresentations is the factfinder's viewing the
competing evidence in context. Where the plaintiff has no basis for
her belief that the defendant discriminated against her because of
her sex, the factfinder will most likely find for the defendant. But
where the defendant's articulation is merely a statement unsup-
ported by documentary proof, or perhaps documentary proof cre-
ated after the lawsuit commenced,234 the plaintiff's rebuttal need
not do much to obtain a trial. To create a question of fact concerning
the defendant's credibility, 235 a plaintiff should not be required to
set forth much more than the prima facie case.
if [defendant]'s conclusions on (plaintiffl's abilities might be without a sound basis, (plaintiff]
fails to establish an ADEA violation if the evaluation was in good faith").
"2 See supra Part III-A.
2" See generally Lanctot, supra note 55.
2" See Healy v. New York Life Ins. Cu., 860 F.2d 1209,1223 (3d Cir. 1988) (Shapiro, J.,
dissenting) (post-termination evaluation without more suggests proffered reason is pretex-
tual).
2" In Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1988), the court applied
the quantum and quality of proof theory properly. In that case, there was overwhelming
evidence that the plaintiff, a salesperson alleging he was fired because of his age, consistently
had performed below par and in an inferior way to all the other members of the salesforce.
Id. at 826-27. The defendant submitted evidence demonstrating that statistical information
had been used to evaluate the plaintiff, concluding that the plaintiff's sales volume growth
and "budget accomplishment" had trailed the salesforce average. Id. at 827. The plaintiff's
1982 evaluation had criticized the plaintiff for his lack of account development and his lack
of aggression. Id. As a consequence, the plaintiff was put on probation. Id. The next year
Young's boss once again reviewed his work and kept him on formal probation from month
to month. Id. The majority of the plaintiff's sales figures continued to be below average. Id.
The performance review also criticized the plaintiff for his damaged merchandise expenses
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Where the quantum and quality of proof produced by the
plaintiff and the defendant are equal, a court's decision that the
plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact is either a
credibility finding in the defendant's favor or a presumption that
its articulated reason is the real reason for the defendant's action.
The former is forbidden by Liberty Lobby, while the latter is barred
by McDonnell Douglas. Given that the plaintiff has already made out
a prima facie case at this stage, creating a presumption in the
defendant's favor contravenes the Supreme Court's reasons for
establishing a prima facie case by use of the McDonnell Douglas
construct. 236
Case Three: Assume once again that Connie Computer sues MBI
for sex discrimination in its failure to promote her over Mr. Known-
othing. MBI moves for summary judgment. This time, MBI pres-
ents clear, specific documentary proof, including: testimony from
its personnel director that Mr. Knownothing is better qualified than
Connie Computer; the performance evaluations for Mr. Knowno-
thing and Ms. Computer; college transcripts; evaluations of the
relevance of their prior work experience and its relation to the job
in question; and the announced job specifications. Connie Com-
puter responds with nothing more than a bare bones prima facie
case. The court should grant the motion using the sliding-scale
approach. Because the defendant has met its heightened burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
articulated reason for promoting Mr. Knownothing over Connie
Computer is pretextual. Although the plaintiff may satisfy this bur-
den at trial simply by destroying the defendant's evidence (and
likewise its credibility) on cross-examination, in order to conduct
which were the highest in the region. Id. The review further noted that his sales volume
figures, excluding those of Crystal Light, a new product that was marketed only in the
plaintiff's sales region, placed him last among sales personnel in the southeast. Id. In response
to this evidence, the plaintiff had very little evidence from which discrimination could be
inferred. Id, He did not dispute the defendant's evidence of his inferior sales, but rather
argued that the defendant had fired him because of his age. The court of appeals properly
upheld the grant of summary judgment, Id. at 828. It did not automatically credit the
defendant's articulated reason for firing the plaintiff. Rather, it looked at the evidence
presented by the defendant and the plaintiff and concluded that although it is improper for
the court to weigh evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion, this was not a case
where the district court weighed the evidence of both parties to conclude that the defendant's
argument was weightier. Id. at 831. Instead, it was a case where the defendant's justification
evidence completely overwhelmed any inference to be drawn from the plaintiff's evidence.
Id. Thus, the court could affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment.
236 In light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, such a presumption contravenes congressional
intent as well.
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this cross-examination, a plaintiff will presumably need evidence to
shake the witness. Thus, at the summary judgment stage, Connie
Computer should present at least some of this evidence, either
documentary or testamentary, in opposition to the summary judg-
ment motion. Because the defendant offered substantial evidence
tending to show that Mr. Knownothing was promoted over Connie
Computer because he was better qualified for the job, Ms. Computer
must respond with similar quantum and quality of evidence to
survive the motion."" This is not to suggest that the plaintiff must
specifically rebut each and every piece of evidence that the defen-
dant offerS.238 Rather, the totality of the plaintiff's evidence should
permit an inference that MBI promoted Mr. Knownothing over Ms.
Computer for reasons other than superior job qualifications.
Whatever evidence the court considers in determining whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court should keep in
mind that the plaintiff has already made out a prima facie case of
discrimination and that the evidence creating a prima facie case is
still relevant to the factfinder's ultimate decision. A plaintiff can
prove discrimination by showing that an inference can be drawn
from the totality of the evidence that, more likely than not, the
defendant made the employment decision with discriminatory in-
tent. Therefore, to determine whether a question of fact exists for
the factfinder, the court must look at the evidence in its totality, just
as the factfinder would examine the evidence.
237 For example, if the defendant alleges that the plaintiff was fired because of an inability
to get along with subordinates and presents the affidavit of its corporate representative with
no documentary proof or with weak documentary proof, the plaintiff should be able to rebut
this articulation with personal testimony establishing an ability to get along well with subor-
dinates, citing to examples.
If, on the other hand, the defendant offers documentary proof of consistent criticisms
in performance evaluations and warnings that the plaintiff will be fired if the situation is nut
corrected, then the plaintiff may need to present more evidence than personal testimony to
create a genuine issue of material fact for the factfinder. The plaintiff could offer the affidavit
of a subordinate or some other person with an opportunity to observe the situation averring
that plaintiff got along well with subordinates. Likewise, the plaintiff could offer testimony
that other persons not within the protected class were not repeatedly warned and disciplined
as she had been for the same offense.
"8 Some courts have required plaintiffs to respond with such specificity that his impos-
sible for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., No. 91-1173, 1992 WL 121705, at *7 (7th Cir. June 8, 1992) ("Unless he attacks
the specific reasons given for a termination, a plaintiff who stresses evidence of satisfactory
performance is simply challenging the wisdom of the employer's decision, which we have
consistently refused to review."); Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)
(requiring the plaintiff to specifically produce evidence to discredit the defendant's proffered
reasons of "instability" and "lack of commitment" by comparing "prior employment histories
of applicants" or offering an "empirical study of police officer employment patterns").
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In determining how much proof and what quality of proof is
needed to rebut the defendant's articulated reason for its employ-
ment decision, courts should consider the sophistication of today's
defendants. 239 Many companies are known to keep bad comments
in all employee files in order to defend against potential suits. 24°
Consequently, negative comments in an employee's earlier perfor-
mance reviews are not necessarily reliable. Performance reviews and
notes placed in an employee's files after the conflict between the
employee and employer arises should have little or no probative
value because they are after-the-fact justifications for the employer's
actions. 24 '
Case Four: Assume that MBI moves for summary judgment,
supporting its motion with the same evidence as in Case Three.
Connie Computer responds by setting out a prima facie case but
also submits statistical evidence demonstrating that MBI has very
few women in management positions along with evidence of sexist
remarks that her supervisor had made to her, or her own testimony
that her performance reviews were not as glowing as those of Mr.
Knownothing because he had been given a better sales territory, or
both. This evidence should raise a genuine issue of material fact
whether the defendant's articulated reason for promoting Mr.
Knownothing over Ms. Computer was the real reason for its actions.
The court should therefore deny the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy has had
the effect, whether intended or not, of depriving many deserving
Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs of the right to a trial. Too many
lower courts have interpreted the trilogy as a license to weigh evi-
dence, draw inferences in favor of the defendant when it moves
239 See supra note 45.
24e See Victor Scachter & Joanne Dellaverson, Employee Relations, ABA BANK. J. 78 (Sept.
1983) (suggesting preventive actions against discrimination suits including an evaluation
process that includes recording both positive and negative comments); see also Tony Mauro,
How the EEOC Is Reaching Out to Employers; Voluntary Assistance Program, NaTtoN's Bus. 25
(Aug. 1984) (responding to the question of how to fire an employee who happens to be a
minority, EF,OC official stated, With proper documentation and a consistent policy, they
can fire people.").
241 See Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1223 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) (Shapiro,
J., dissenting) ("its very existence is aberrational and pretextual"); Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc
Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) (negative performance evaluation placed in personnel
file after plaintiff was asked to retire and six days before termination valuable only because
it entitled jury to conclude defendant acted with discriminatory intent).
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for summary judgment, assess witness credibility and require plain-
tiffs to prove their cases at the summary judgment stage.
In discrimination suits, the courts must interpret the trilogy in
light of the purposes behind the substantive legal standard set forth
in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Because those who discriminate
rarely admit to discrimination and almost never leave "smoking
gun" evidence in their files, plaintiffs necessarily resort to subtle
circumstantial evidence to prove their cases. In McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent difficulties
for plaintiffs in discrimination cases and established a formula that
would make it easier for plaintiffs to prove that their employers
had discriminated against them.
Contrary to the clear holding of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, which
requires the courts to consider the substantive evidentiary standards
applicable in the case in deciding whether to grant summary judg-
ment, lower courts have misapplied the McDonnell DouglasIBurdine
standard when considering an employer's motion for summary
judgment in Title VII and ADEA cases. Because of this improper
use of the trilogy and McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, Title VII and
ADEA plaintiffs have a greater burden defending motions for sum-
mary judgment than they would have at trial.
Courts can reconcile the trilogy with the McDonnell Douglas!
Burdine formula. Courts must avoid automatically crediting defen-
dants' reasons, drawing inferences in defendants' favor, deciding
witnesses' credibility on paper and requiring plaintiffs to prove their
cases at the summary judgment stage.
Although Celotex seems to have lightened a defendant's initial
burden in bringing a summary judgment motion in an ordinary
civil case, courts must interpret Celotex in light of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine standard, a standard that places a burden on de-
fendants to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
employment decisions. Thus, courts should require a defendant
moving for summary judgment to prove more than a defendant in
an ordinary civil case before the burden is shifted to the plaintiff
to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
the defendant's alleged reason for its employment decision is pre-
textual. Furthermore, courts should employ a sliding scale in de-
termining whether to grant the motion. That is, the quantum and
quality of the defendant's proof should determine the proof the
plaintiff needs to present in order to raise a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact. When a plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether a defendant's articulated reason is pretextual, the
court should deny the defendant's motion.
